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1 Introduction  
 This thesis focuses on the influence of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 
on the Constitution of the UK. The enacting of the CRA was the result of a long 
process of constitutional reform, which has considerably transformed the British 
Constitution. I find it necessary to include the explanation of the term constitution 
in European and British perspective, as I believe the process it has undergone 
in the past twenty years is not going to be comprehensible without its definition. 
For the same reasons I decided to talk about the constitutional principles – 
the separation of powers, the rule of law and the sovereignty of Parliament which 
are of paramount importance to the unwritten British Constitution. In particular, 
the separation of power – or lack thereof – in the British Constitution was one 
of the reasons for enacting the CRA and because of its great influence, all of these 
doctrines and the balance between them have been affected 
 As the CRA has arisen as part of a constitutional process, I will introduce 
the circumstances which lead to its initial proposal. 
 The goal of this thesis is to introduce the CRA as a result of British 
historical development, the European and domestic influences on the UK, and 
to summarize and evaluate the changes it caused in the UK. I will describe how 
these changes have impacted mainly upon the post of the Lord Chancellor, 
the Supreme Court and the Judicial Appointment Committee and I will explain 
how the balance of powers changed after it was implemented. In the last chapter, I 
will suggest the possible future development of the British Constitution based 
on my own observations as well as on observations made by various theoreticians 
of law.  
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2 Sources of Constitution 
This chapter will explain the meaning of the word constitution, how 
constitutions came to be and how they are divided, as well as provide 
a description of the British Constitution and its sources. 
 What is constitution? 2.1
To define the term constitution we must introduce the two prominent views 
of the constitution. 
In its narrow meaning, constitution is a single document or series 
of documents with a special legal status containing all the basic rules and 
principles of a state
1
. In some countries, the constitution has an overriding legal 
force, such as in the USA or Czech Republic, which means that law which 
contradicts the constitution will not be applied or in some cases, it will be 
derogated. The law is usually declared as incompatible with the constitution 
in proceedings in front of a high –ranking court, which interprets the text 
of the constitution in disputed cases (e.g. the Supreme Court in the USA 
or  the Constitutional Court in Czech Republic)
2
.  
The broader view says that a constitution is a text and a set of rules (laws, 
institutions and customs, derived from certain principles, both written and 
unwritten) which sets out the fundamental law of the nation. As such, it provides 
a framework of basic rules which describe the main institutions of the state and 
the relationship between them. It places limits on the exercise of power and sets 
out the principles of basic human rights as well as rights and duties of individual 
citizens
3
.  
2.1.1 History of constitutions 
The term constitution first appeared in the 18th century and its primary 
meaning is to set out or to form. It was used as a description of common laws 
which governed the functioning of the French monarchy. At first, constitutions 
                                                 
1
 CAVENDISH PUBLISHING LIMITED. Constitutional Law. 4. vyd. Great Britain: Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 2004, s. 1. ISBN 1-85941-941-0. 
2
 BRADLEY, A.W. a K.D. EWING. Constitutional and administrative law. 15. vyd. Great Britain: 
Longman, 2010, s. 4. ISBN 978-1405873505. 
3
 LEYLAND, Peter. Constitution of the United Kingdom:  A Contextual Analysis (Constitutional 
Systems of the World). Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012, 362 s. 2nd Revised edition, s.1.  ISBN 978-
1849461603. 
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developed mostly to limit the power of the monarch and to prevent absolutism, 
as well as to set out basic rules by which the main organs of the state would 
function and the balance between these organs. In time, this safeguard 
and the organizational functions of the constitution were joined by the principles 
of basic human rights.  
During democratic revolutions in modern history, the term developed 
further. It no longer referred simply to laws governing the functioning of a state, 
but also included declarations, constitutions, various decisions 
of the constitutional courts and other laws. These acts were usually the result 
of a new political authority coming into power and needing to establish 
the principles by which they would rule. 
The condition of an existing and functioning constitution is a democratic 
system, mainly the plurality of powers and political opinions
4
. 
2.1.2 Rigid and flexible type of constitution 
A rigid constitution is a system in which the constitutional law has greater 
force than other laws, and constitutions can only be altered by a special legislative 
process (e.g. in Czech Republic the 3/5 majority of Chamber of Deputies 
and the 3/5 of the Senators present must vote for such a change
5
), whereas 
a flexible constitution requires no special procedure to be altered.
6
  
2.1.3 Written and unwritten constitution 
As was mentioned before, the word constitution in the meaning we now 
know it first appeared in 18
th
 century as a result of the French and American 
revolutions. It is then when it became identified with a single document or series 
of documents. A common characteristic of written or also modern constitutions is 
that they were usually drawn up to introduce a new system of government to mark 
a distinct break with the previous regime
7
 and the making of a constitution usually 
followed a fundamental political event. Tom Paine stressed the political 
                                                 
4
 KLÍMA, Karel. Ústavní právo. 3. vyd. Plzeň: Aleš Čeněk s.r.o., 2006, s 42-43. ISBN 80-7380-
000-4. 
5
 Česká Republika. Ústava České republiky. In: 1/1993 Sb.článek.39, 1992. 
6
 BLAHOŢ, Josef, Vladimír BALAŠ a Karel KLÍMA. Srovnávací ústavní právo. 2. vyd. Praha: 
ASPI Publishing, 2003, s. 79. ISBN 80-86395-89-8. 
7
 CAVENDISH PUBLISHING LIMITED. Constitutional Law. 4. vyd. Great Britain: Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 2004, s. 2-5. ISBN 1-85941-941-0. 
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significance of the new concept of constitutions ―A constitution is a thing 
antecedent to a government, and a government is only the creature 
of a constitution… A constitution is not the act of a government, but of a people 
constituting a government, and government without a constitution, is a power 
without a right”. 8 
This type of constitution has been adopted all across the world with nearly 
200 states now having written constitutions of the modern type. These modern 
constitutions also possess varying degrees of authority, and the vast majority 
of these constitutions have been fundamentally amended in the last thirty years.  
Modern constitutions serve as instruments of government by guiding 
and controlling the procedures of public decision making, and also as documents 
which highlight the symbols of unity and identity.
9
 
There are very few countries which do not possess a written constitution. 
Examples are the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Israel as well as countries 
that consider Koran to be their highest law.
10
 Unwritten constitutions are made out 
of constitutional conventions, judge made law and ordinary laws. They may also 
be considered less precise, since they draw on custom and practice as opposed 
to formal rules. It can be argued however, that these practices are always evolving 
and they may be able to reflect the changes in the political culture of the nation 
much more easily than written constitutions.
11
 
Distinguishing between written and unwritten constitutions may 
sometimes not be so clear and could be considered relative, as we can find 
documents forming unwritten constitutions, at least to some degree, in writing 
also.
12
  
                                                 
8
 BRADLEY, A.W. a K.D. EWING. Constitutional and administrative law. 15. vyd. Great Britain: 
Longman, 2010, s. 5. ISBN 978-1405873505. 
9
 LOUGHLIN, Martin. The British Constitution: A Very Short Introduction. Gosport, Hampshire: 
Ashford Colour Press Ltd, 2009, s. 11-13. ISBN 978-0-19-969769-4. 
10
 KLÍMA, Karel. Ústavní právo. 3. vyd. Plzeň: Aleš Čeněk s.r.o., 2006, s. 47. ISBN 80-7380-000-
4. 
11
 LOUGHLIN, Martin. The British Constitution: A Very Short Introduction. Gosport, Hampshire: 
Ashford Colour Press Ltd, 2009, s. 13. ISBN 978-0-19-969769-4. 
12
 BLAHOŢ, Josef, Vladimír BALAŠ a Karel KLÍMA. Srovnávací ústavní právo. 2. vyd. Praha: 
ASPI Publishing, 2003, s. 79. ISBN 80-86395-89-8. 
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 British Constitution 2.2
The most distinctive feature of the British Constitution is the fact that it 
has not been wholly reduced to writing. It has not been codified and it is highly 
flexible as, in theory, Parliament is not bound by any law and it may enact any 
law it wishes to enable the constitution to react quickly to the current situation 
of the nation.
13
 It is one of the few constitutions that have remained unwritten. 
Because the written concept of constitution is so prevalent in the modern world, 
we can encounter opinions which state that Britain does not even possess 
a constitution. The fact is that even though we cannot find the British Constitution 
in one single document and that the relationships between high organs of the state 
may not even be codified in the form of law, this does not mean that 
the constitution does not exist. 
14
  
In spite of the fact that the British Constitution lacks formal codification, it 
does display the broad characteristics of a liberal democracy and a constitutional 
framework.
15
 The lack of a written constitution resulted in a vacuum which 
needed to be filled by principles and doctrines to ensure constitutional principles 
would be upheld and upon which the current constitution stands. These doctrines 
were the sovereignty of Parliament and the rule of law. There are no formal 
restraints upon the exercise of power in the UK, though this has been partially 
diminished by enacting various Acts of Parliament (such as the Human Rights Act 
in 1998). As a result of these changes, the power of the courts has been largely 
extended, especially in the area of upholding and protecting of human rights. 
16
  
The fact that there is no written constitution also affects the sources 
of constitutional law. As a result of this, more sources of constitutional law must 
be taken into consideration than in other countries. The British Constitution is also 
much less reliant on legal rules and safeguards than other constitutions, as there is 
                                                 
13
 CAVENDISH PUBLISHING LIMITED. Constitutional Law. 4. vyd. Great Britain: Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 2004, s.4-5. ISBN 1-85941-941-0. 
14
 LOUGHLIN, Martin. The British Constitution: A Very Short Introduction. Gosport, Hampshire: 
Ashford Colour Press Ltd, 2009, s. 14. ISBN 978-0-19-969769-4. 
15
 LEYLAND, Peter. Constitution of the United Kingdom:  A Contextual Analysis (Constitutional 
Systems of the World). Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012, 362 s. 2nd Revised edition, s.23.  ISBN 
978-1849461603. 
16
 BRADLEY, A.W. a K.D. EWING. Constitutional and administrative law. 15. vyd. Great 
Britain: Longman, 2010, s. 7-8. ISBN 978-1405873505. 
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no actual body of rules which governs the organs of state and government. It 
instead relies upon constitutional conventions and principles.  
It is very difficult to describe the British Constitution in the usual 
constitutional terms; the way it is usually described is a summary of the past 
constitutional experience. For example, the sovereignty of Parliament has been 
derived purely from the behaviour of courts and Parliament over many years, 
and constitutional conventions reflect the balance of power between the individual 
powers of the state at a particular point in time. 
17
 
2.2.1 Why is the British Constitution unwritten? 
As explained previously, the constitutions of the modern kind were usually 
a result of a critical moment in the history of a state, and have been adopted 
as the foundations of the newly formed governmental authority. 
If we look at the development of the UK since the 18
th
 century, we will see 
that there has actually been no major revolution in Britain ever since this new type 
of constitution emerged.  Britain has suffered no fundamental breakdown 
of government, no defeat in war or revolution of any kind; therefore, there was no 
genuine constitutional moment and therefore no reason for the British to change 
their constitution.
18
  
In addition to this historical reason, there is also a conceptual one. 
To understand that, we need to revisit the concept of the sovereignty 
of Parliament. According to this principle, there cannot be any superior authority 
to Parliament which could limit its powers in any way. If this were to remain true, 
there can never be a codified institution, as such a document would surely place 
limitation upon its power.
19
 
The British constitution could thus be summed up as in just eight words 
“What the Queen in Parliament enacts is law”.20 In other words, unless 
                                                 
17
 BOGDANOR, Vernon. The New British Constitution. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009, s. 19-26. 
ISBN 978-1841136714. 
18
 LOUGHLIN, Martin. The British Constitution: A Very Short Introduction. Gosport, Hampshire: 
Ashford Colour Press Ltd, 2009, s. 14-16. ISBN 978-0-19-969769-4. 
19
  BOGDANOR, Vernon. The New British Constitution. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009, s. 13-14. 
ISBN 978-1841136714 
20
 BOGDANOR, Vernon. The New British Constitution. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009, s. 13. 
ISBN 978-1841136714. 
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the principle of sovereignty of Parliament is abandoned, there is no point 
in having a written constitution.  
2.2.2 Constitutionalism 
The current western tradition assumes the existence of a written 
constitution, the existence of a democratic parliament, independent state organs 
that uphold and respect law, and a system of independent courts which serve 
to protect the citizens from abuse of power. 
The idea of constitutionalism is partially associated with this system. It is 
clearly recognizable where the state‘s authority and legitimacy is derived from, 
and what the limits of its power are. Since in the UK there is no such formal limit, 
demands for a new constitution and a new Bill of Rights have been rising, 
supported also by the belief, that the parliamentary process does not in fact protect 
the public against the abuse of power as well as it should. All these factors have 
led to increased number of constitutional reforms.
21
  
2.2.3 Constitutional law 
Constitutional law is characterized as ―part of national law which governs 
the system of public administration and the relationships between the individual 
and the state”.22 As well as the idea of constitutionalism, there are issues arising 
from the fact that the British Constitution is not written. Constitutional law 
expects the existence of laws which regulate the power and set out the framework 
and structure of the principal organs of government. In the UK however, many 
of these rules are not in fact governed by law.  
Another issue with defining constitutional law would be that in the UK 
there is no real line between constitutional law and other branches of law. ―There 
is hardly any department of law which does not at one time or another, become 
of constitutional importance”. Examples could be found in the fields of family 
law (the constitutional importance could be seen in the right for protection 
of family life) or in criminal law (in the procedure of criminal law numerous civil 
                                                 
21
 BRADLEY, A.W. a K.D. EWING. Constitutional and administrative law. 15. vyd. Great 
Britain: Longman, 2010, s.8.  ISBN 978-1405873505. 
22
 BRADLEY, A.W. a K.D. EWING. Constitutional and administrative law. 15. vyd. Great 
Britain: Longman, 2010, s. 9. ISBN 978-1405873505. 
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liberty issues arose, and their solutions are now considered 
a part of the constitutional law).
23
 
In theory, all Acts of Parliament could be regarded as equally important, 
as they have the exact same status as one another (e.g. Human Rights Act has 
the  same status as Dangerous Dogs Act), but their actual importance is 
determined by the courts. Even though we cannot always be sure which law 
constitutes the constitution, there is a consensus which says that those laws which 
govern the relationship between parts of the UK or between the high state organs, 
and laws concerned with voting are considered to be forming a constitution.
24
 
It is also important to realise that any given definition of constitutional law 
or constitution in the UK needs to be adjusted regularly as the principles 
and conventions which govern them continue to evolve over time.  
2.2.4 Development of the British Constitution 
The British Constitution is one of the few which has not been designed 
according to any ideology or theory. The principles upon which it now stands 
have been accumulated over the centuries as a response to historical 
circumstances and important events.
25
  
The British Constitution consists partially of written documents 
and unwritten rules. To understand it fully, we often need to interpret ordinary 
laws as well. Common law is one of the pillars of the British constitutional 
tradition.  The strength of common law is that it reflects and moderates the current 
situation. It responds to actual struggles of the state without the need 
to stand for any grand philosophical theory. 
26
 From the common law principles, 
other principles such as the sovereignty of the Parliament and royal prerogative 
arose. The gaps in law were filled with the creation of constitutional conventions, 
and later by written laws.
27
  
                                                 
23
 BRADLEY, A.W. a K.D. EWING. Constitutional and administrative law. 15. vyd. Great 
Britain: Longman, 2010, s. 8-9. ISBN 978-1405873505. 
24
 KLÍMA, Karel. Ústavní právo. 3. vyd. Plzeň: Aleš Čeněk s.r.o., 2006, s. 63-64. ISBN 80-7380-
000-4. 
25
 LOUGHLIN, Martin. The British Constitution: A Very Short Introduction. Gosport, Hampshire: 
Ashford Colour Press Ltd, 2009, s. 11. ISBN 978-0-19-969769-4. 
26
 LAWS, John. The Common Law Constitution: (The Hamlyn Lectures). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014, s. 7. ISBN 978-1107434653. 
27
 KLÍMA, Karel. Ústavní právo. 3. vyd. Plzeň: Aleš Čeněk s.r.o., 2006, s. 63-64. ISBN 80-7380-
000-4. 
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However, such a setup does not really comply with the current views 
of constitution, which is why many British scholars and publicists have, during 
the past twenty years or so, expressed the need to reform the constitution, as they 
believe the British system has lost its way.
28
 The belief that the unwritten rules 
of the constitutional practice must now be formalized had become more common. 
This process had actually started in early 1990‘s and has been continuing until 
today. Some authors, such as Vernon Bogdanor, actually proclaim that since 
the recent reforms we should be speaking about ‗the new British Constitution‘.29 
Others, such as Martin Loughlin, say that the changing of the constitution ―does 
not signal the emergence of a new constitution, but it merely marks the extent 
to which the old constitution has lost its guiding spirit and must now be shored 
up by formal rules”.30 A whole different approach has been expressed in the book 
The Common Law Constitution by John Laws
31
, who I believe is very much 
a proponent in the common law method and its high adaptability.  
 Sources of the Constitution 2.3
Because of the character of the British Constitution and the constitutional 
law in the UK, it is difficult to be precise about what should actually be included 
under the sources of constitution. That is why it is important to have a good 
overview of the elements that make up the constitution. The most common 
division of the sources would be to legal and non-legal.
32
  
2.3.1 Legal sources 
Legal sources are further divided into legislation, common law, European 
Union law and the royal prerogative. 
                                                 
28
 LOUGHLIN, Martin. The British Constitution: A Very Short Introduction. Gosport, Hampshire: 
Ashford Colour Press Ltd, 2009, s. 39-41. ISBN 978-0-19-969769-4. 
29
 BOGDANOR, Vernon. The New British Constitution. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009, 334 s. 
ISBN 978-1841136714. 
30
 LOUGHLIN, Martin. The British Constitution: A Very Short Introduction. Gosport, Hampshire: 
Ashford Colour Press Ltd, 2009, s. 41. ISBN 978-0-19-969769-4. 
31
 LAWS, John. The Common Law Constitution: (The Hamlyn Lectures). Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014, 105 s. ISBN 978-1107434653. 
32
 CAVENDISH PUBLISHING LIMITED. Constitutional Law. 4. vyd. Great Britain: Cavendish 
Publidhing Limited, 2004, s. 8. ISBN 1-85941-941-0. 
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 Legislation 2.3.1.1
Since there is no written constitution, many Acts of Parliament which 
govern the system of government have been enacted. These Acts however do not 
complete the constitutional code and many areas have not yet been enacted.
33
 
As was said before, in theory all Acts have the same status, but there are some 
statues which have a special constitutional significance. 
34
 
Magna Carta - was granted in 1215, it placed limits upon the power 
of monarch, set out rights of various classes of the medieval community, freed 
the Church from the state power and gave more freedom to the cities.  
Petition of Right – granted in 1628, was concerned with loans and taxes - 
King was newly required to have the permission of the Parliament. 
Bill of Rights – granted in 1689, strengthened the position 
of the Parliament at the expense of the power of the Crown, many of its principal 
provisions are still in force. 
Acts of Settlement – granted in 1700, together with the Bill of Rights it 
marked the victory of Parliament by further strengthening their position, gave 
more protection to judges and dealt with the issue of line of succession 
to the throne. 
Other statues of constitutional importance – the Act of Union 
with Scotland 1707, the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949, the European 
Communities Act 1972, the British Nationality Act 1981, the Public Order Act 
1986 and more recently the Scotland Act 1998, the Human Rights Act 1998, 
the House of Lords Act 1999, the Terrorism Act 2000 and the Constitutional 
Reform Act 2005.  
These Acts do not require a special procedure to be followed 
in the Parliament, even though they amend the constitution. The House 
                                                 
33
 BRADLEY, A.W. a K.D. EWING. Constitutional and administrative law. 15. vyd. Great 
Britain: Longman, 2010, s. 13. ISBN 978-1405873505. 
34
 LEYLAND, Peter. Constitution of the United Kingdom:  A Contextual Analysis (Constitutional 
Systems of the World). Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012, 362 s. 2nd Revised edition, s. 26.  ISBN 
978-1849461603. 
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of Commons may examine these Bills in more detail and these Acts may easily be 
repealed by a newer Act.
35
   
 Case Law 2.3.1.2
Even though Parliament is sovereign and may enact any law it wishes, it is 
the courts which apply the law in given cases.
36
 These decisions, also called 
precedents, are binding and used to develop the law. Some of them have expanded 
the common law in a constitutional context (e.g. the case of Entick v Carrington, 
which is concerned with trespassing, ―placed the limits on powers of the Crown 
and Secretary of State to interfere with the person or property of the citizen 
without lawful authority‖). 37 
Common law is a binding principle of the British Constitution and its 
important source. It is based on the ideas of reason, fairness, and presumption 
of liberty. John Laws explains the method of common law as a fourfold 
of evolution, experiment, history and distillation.  
By evolution, he means, ―the rules of law are honed through the doctrine 
of precedent”38. Even though the doctrine of stare decisis (stand by what has been 
decided) is applied, the Supreme Court and High Courts are not bound their own 
decisions, which enables the development of the law. 
Experiment – the common law itself is a hypothesis and as such, it will 
work until it has been disproved and as that has not happened yet, it must mean 
that it does in fact work.  
History – respect for history and respect of law has been an important 
driving force in the development of the British Constitution. 
Distillation – is the process of adjusting the old law in order for it to be 
able to reflect the present state and fill out the gaps that may have emerged.
39
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These four methods ensure that the common law is ‗endlessly creative‘, 
living law built on tradition but constantly evolving to fit the modern world. 
Interpretation of statute law means that it is the courts who interpret law, 
especially in cases where the correct meaning of an Act is in question. The courts 
seek the intention of Parliament by using the established principles 
of interpretation, internal aids (found in the Act itself), or external aids. 
In some decisions, the courts have used the presumed interpretations 
to develop the common law constitutional rights (e.g. the right to access 
to a court).  
Most of the methods of interpretations have evolved from the judicial 
decisions themselves, but some may be given by Parliament (e.g. ―all legislation, 
whenever made, must so far as it is possible to do so, be read and given effect 
in a way that is compatible with the rights protected by the European 
Convention‖).40  
 European Union law 2.3.1.3
The UK joined the European Union (then European Communities) in 1972 
and since then the British law culture has been influenced by the European one. 
The establishing treaties, directives, and regulations issued 
by the European Union may have a direct effect in the UK and since the Human 
Rights Act was enacted, the European Convention on Human Rights has also been 
incorporated.
41
  
The non-codified British Constitution with an unclear separation of powers 
did not really correspond with the European view of a constitution 
and the pressure of the EU on the UK was one of the reasons for the era 
of the constitutional change in the UK. 
 Royal Prerogative 2.3.1.4
Royal prerogative has its origins in historical powers of a monarch when 
monarchs were involved in the process of government in a more direct way. 
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Nowadays few such powers remain and they are mainly exercised by Ministers.
42
  
The examples of the powers exercised by the Queen could be – the right 
to prorogue Parliament, granting royal pardons, making treaties, declaring war, 
deploying armed forces, and appointing the Prime Minister.
43
  
2.3.2 Non legal sources  
Non legal sources are divided into conventions and books of authority. 
In spite of them not being laws, they still have a very significant impact 
on the constitution and are crucial to understanding how the British Constitution 
functions. 
44
 
 Conventions 2.3.2.1
Conventions determine the practices of government and some aspects 
of the conduct of state institutions and unlike laws; they are not enforceable 
at court. According to AV Dicey
45
 the conventions ―consists of maxims 
or practices which, though they regulate the ordinary conduct of the Crown, 
of ministers, and of other persons under the constitution, are not in strictness laws 
at all”. 46 
They consist of understandings, habits, practices, and maxims which are 
needed in order for the high organs of state to function properly. The conventional 
rules of the constitution are, for example, royal assent must be given to a Bill 
which has been approved by both Houses of Parliament in order for it to become 
an Act; the Prime Minister will resign immediately in the event that he/she did not 
get the confidence of a majority in the Commons; all appointments are made 
by the monarch on the advice of the Prime Minister and many others. 
47
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 Books of authority 2.3.2.2
In general, no legal textbook is considered a source of law. The authority 
of the most important text is only to the extent it is considered to have accurately 
reproduced enacted law. 
48
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3 Separation of powers 
This chapter will examine the constitutional principles which affect 
the British Constitution, with the focus on the doctrine of the separation of powers 
and its development and individual powers and state organs of the UK. 
As mentioned in the introduction I find it necessary to include a chapter 
about the constitutional principles since the enactment of the Constitutional 
Reform Act changed their relationship considerably and I believe the change can 
only be seen by comparing these doctrines prior to the Act and after it came 
into force. 
 Constitutional Principles  3.1
Parliamentary sovereignty, the rule of law and the separation of powers are 
the constitutional principles governing the functioning of the British Constitution. 
They are important for their historical importance as well as for the current 
practice of law. The doctrines upon which the constitutional principles are based 
are related and influenced by each other in the sense that laws must gain their 
legitimacy in a sovereign Parliament, functioning as a separate organ of the state, 
but at the same time, the laws must not be arbitrary or abusive– they must respond 
to the doctrine of rule of law.
49
 
 Parliamentary sovereignty 3.2
The doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty is the fundamental principle. 
Firstly, it means that in theory the Parliament can pass or repeal any law it wishes 
with basically no interference from other high organs of government (e.g. courts 
cannot declare statute invalid). Secondly, it says that provisions in a more recent 
statute will prevail over ones in an older one and thirdly, that there is no other 
body which could challenge the validity of laws made by Parliament 
as long as they have passed the law-making process in the correct manner. 
Professors Wade and Allan have developed an influential view 
of Parliamentary sovereignty by claiming, ―Legislation obtains its force 
from the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, which is itself a creature 
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of the common law and whose detailed content and limits are therefore of judicial 
making. Parliament is sovereign because the judges acknowledge its legal 
and political supremacy‖50  
In the 19
th
 century the Parliament was politically supreme - it was in fact 
able to control governments - but with the growth of political parties its position 
became weaker and after some time it was in fact the government which 
controlled the Parliament. As was mentioned before, there are no constitutional 
checks upon the power of Parliament‘s legislature (so in this situation de facto no 
checks upon the power of government which controls the Parliament), the lack 
of these formal checks and balances has been sorted by the informal checks – 
the constitutional conventions.
51
  
More limits to the doctrine were implemented in time, especially 
in connection to the European Convention on Human Rights and later the Human 
Rights Act. As mentioned before, after enactment of the HRA and including 
the ECHR into the British law, the Parliament imposed upon the courts new 
interpretational rule – all statutes must be interpreted in a way which is 
compatible with the ECHR. Consequentially the Parliament may no longer enact 
any law it wishes, as this principle also binds the future legislation. 
Even with this limitation, Parliament needed to amend legislative 
provision as the only power the courts have is to issue the declaration 
of incompatibility but it lies upon the Parliament to react to such statement. 
Between the years 2000, when the HRA came into force, and January 2009 there 
were 17 declarations of incompatibility. 14 of them have been remedied and only 
3 of those arose because of the HRA. 
52
 
Recently the UK as well as other European Union members appears to be 
more sceptical when it comes to the EU. In the UK this resulted in the passing 
of the European Union Act in 2011, which attempts to prevent putting more 
power from the UK into the hands of EU by introducing various safeguards 
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and locks (e.g. the need of parliamentary approval and a nation-wide referendum) 
on new EU treaties and proposed changes of the existing ones, thus protecting its 
existing tradition of law and with that the Parliamentary sovereignty.
53
  
 The rule of law 3.3
The rule of law means that there is nothing above the law and all 
individuals are to be equal under the law and not subjected to arbitrary rule. 
3.3.1 Dicey‘s rule of law 
According to AV Dicey, there are three aspects of this principle: 1) “…no 
man is punishable … except for a distinct breach of law established 
in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of the land.” 
2)”…every man, whatever be his rank or condition, is subject 
to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of the ordinary 
tribunals.” 
3)”…the general principles of constitution are with us as the result of judicial 
decisions determining the rights of private persons…”54 
The first aspect means, that no one can suffer any punishment unless he 
broke the law, and no other authority but ordinary courts can judge him. 
These laws and powers should be defined clearly, so that it is obvious that they 
are being breached and under which conditions the power can be applied. 
The second aspect implies that no one is above the law and everyone 
obeys the same law. 
The third aspect is concerned with the protection of individual rights 
which is guaranteed by ordinary remedies of private law. 
The concept of rule of law and sovereignty of Parliament seems at first 
to be opposing each other as it imposes requirements upon the legislation. Dicey 
explains the relationship between the two like this: ―The sovereignty 
of Parliament and the supremacy of the law of the land… may appear to stand 
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in opposition to each other, or to be at best only counterbalancing forces. But this 
appearance is delusive; the sovereignty of Parliament, as contrasted with other 
forms of sovereign power, favours the supremacy of law, whilst the predominance 
of rigid legality throughout our institutions evokes the exercise, and thus 
increases the authority of Parliamentary sovereignty.”55 
In Dicey‘s view, the common law offered better protection 
to the fundamental rights than any written constitution. His view is, however, 
based on many assumptions which no longer apply. Unlike his views 
on the sovereignty of Parliament, his view of the rule of law does not comply 
with today‘s understanding of law.56 
3.3.2 The rule of law today 
The new approach to the rule of law is also based on three statements.  
Law and order better than anarchy. The rule of law doctrine could 
in theory apply to a dictatorship as well as it applies to a democracy, in case that 
the government would not be created in free elections, and its true intentions only 
thrive in today‘s state of political liberty. There needs to be a way for the citizens 
to fight oppression which is seemingly in accordance with the rule of law 
principle. For example in case that law of the given country is emptied of moral 
content, otherwise we cannot truly speak of the rule of law. 
Government according to law. The organs of the state may only operate 
within the limits given by law and can only be created in accordance with law. 
They must be subjected to effective sanctions in case they breach the rules which 
govern their actions. 
The rule of law as a broad doctrine affecting the making of new law. 
The doctrine should also affect the laws enacted in the future. The laws should be 
open, certain, judges should be independent, and courts should remain accessible 
while at the same time the substance of the law itself should actually satisfy 
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the needs of the citizens. These values are often observed in judicial decisions 
and they are included in the ECHR.
57
  
As we can see, the rule of law had changed significantly since the times 
of Dicey and if it is to remain a functioning principle, in not only the UK, but also 
all around the world, it will need to flexibly adapt to the future events and changes 
in understanding of law. 
 Separation of powers 3.4
Separation of powers seeks to avoid the concentration of powers 
in a single body in order to prevent the abuse of governmental power. It separates 
the governmental power into three – the legislature, executive, and the judiciary 
which exercise their power independently.
58
 
3.4.1 John Locke, Montesquieu on the separation of powers 
The doctrine of the separation of powers was developed by John Locke 
and later further by Montesquieu.  
John Locke published Second Treatise of Civil Government in 1690. In it 
he expressed his concern about human nature when it comes to handling power, 
especially when it comes to the ruling of a state. He thought it was too tempting 
for people who possessed the power to make law to also have the executive 
power, as they would then create laws which would suit their personal needs. 
For this reason, he suggested the separation of the executive and legislative 
powers. 
Montesquieu continued to develop the doctrine in 18
th
 century, and based 
his work on the English constitution. He was concerned with not only 
the executive and legislature, but also the judiciary and stated that if these powers 
are not separate from each other there is no liberty. He especially stressed 
the pressing need to have the judicial functions exercised by a separate body.
59
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Even though Montesquieu based his work on the English constitution, he 
failed to take the developing parliamentary form of government, which was then 
an on-going process in the UK, into consideration. Unlike Locke, Montesquieu 
did not attempt to judge the system of power. Instead, he analysed the mechanism 
which was in fact working at the time. He disapproved of absolute power 
of the ruler or the people and instead favoured the separation of powers 
as a means of distributing the power evenly. His theory influenced the modern 
constitutions, especially the one of the US.
60
  
3.4.2 Separation of powers in the UK 
As there is no written constitution in the UK setting out formal rules 
to govern the state, there is no formal separation of powers either. There are 
a number of overlapping powers, such as the control of Parliament over the courts 
(see sovereignty of Parliament) but at the same time the judiciary, while 
performing its constitutional function, keeps the Parliament in check 
through the rule of law.
61
 
Instead of the system of the separation of powers, the UK adopted 
a system of checks and balances which serve the same purpose. 
62
 
 Judicial function 3.5
The most important judicial function is to determine whether some 
disputed, action occurred, while applying the laws made by Parliament. It is 
performed by civil (concerned with private and public law) and criminal 
(concerned with the conduct of trials as well as the sanctions imposed upon those 
who have been convicted) jurisdiction. Some matters (usually the matters 
of government) are also resolved by tribunals, which operate under civil courts. 
Since the UK is a part of the EU, the matters of Community law are resolved 
by the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. UK courts are 
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also bound by the HRA, which means they must take the decisions made 
by the European Court of Human Rights into consideration as well.
63
 
For the judiciary to function, it is necessary that it remains independent 
and impartial. Otherwise, there could be no confidence that the matters 
in front of courts will be handled justly.
64
 However, even after hundreds of years 
of evolution the judiciary is not entirely separated from the government. The most 
significant change to the independence of the judiciary since the Magna Carta was 
the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which established the Supreme Court, 
changed the system of the appointment of judges and the role of the Lord 
Chancellor. 
65
 
3.5.1 System of courts in the UK 
The court system in Britain is rather complicated, as it has been 
developing for over a thousand years. The system changed greatly after enacting 
the CRA by establishing the Supreme Court. 
Criminal cases are dealt with in front of the magistrate‘s courts (for less 
serious offenses) and the Crown Court (for the more serious criminal matters 
and appeals from magistrate‘s courts). Appeals from the Crown Court are decided 
by the High Court and in case the procedure started in front of the High Court, 
the appeal will proceed to the Criminal division of the Court of Appeal, and if 
the matter is of a great importance, to the Supreme Court.  
Civil cases can originate at magistrate‘s courts or the County Court. Its 
appeals are again dealt with by the High Court and then by the Civil Division 
of the Court of Appeal, which consists of three divisions – the Queen‘s Bench 
Division which deals with contract law, personal injury or negligence cases 
and also functions as a supervisory court, the Chancery Division which deals 
with business law, trust law, probate law, insolvency and equity and the Family 
Division which deals with matters such as divorce, children, probate and medical 
treatment. This structure applies in England and Wales.  
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Lastly, the tribunals deal with various day-to-day matters and they form 
a two-tier system – First-tier Tribunal and an Upper Tribunal which functions 
as an appellate court. The Court of Appeal once again handles the appeals 
from Upper Tribunal.
66
 
Prior to the CRA the functions of the highest courts were divided between 
the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, and the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council. As these bodies were a part of the executive as well 
as the legislature, there was limited transparency and independence. This system 
was criticised by Europe for lacking clarity which was one of the reasons 
for the Supreme Court to be established.
67
 
 Legislative function 3.6
By legislative, we mean the enactment of laws which determine the rules 
governing the structure of powers, public authorities as well as those which 
govern the conduct of citizens and private bodies. In the UK, this happens when 
a Bill (a proposal of law) is approved by both houses of Parliament – the House 
of Lords and House of Commons – and is granted the royal assent.  
The legislative function is carried out by the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom and Northern Ireland as the supreme legislative body, the Scottish 
Parliament, the National Assembly of Wales, the Northern Ireland Assembly 
and by European Union. 
68
 
3.6.1 Parliament of the UK 
Since its formulation in the 13
th
 century, the role of Parliament has been 
changing considerably, though it never ceased to exist. Its continuous existence is 
a proof of the flexibility of the British Constitution and its unshakeable position is 
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the most important reason why the British never formalised a legal concept 
of the state nor the system of administrative law.
69
  
The Parliament consists of the House of Commons, whose 645 members 
are elected, and the House of Lords, whose members are largely life peers 
(appointed for life), hereditary peers, Law Lords (prior to CRA) and bishops. Both 
houses also have a Speaker, whose role is to communicate requests of Parliament 
to the Queen. The Parliament is also crucial to formation of the government, 
since it is the leader of the party with majority of votes who becomes a Prime 
Minister.
70
  
The Constitutional Reform Act influenced the composition of House 
of Lords by removing the Law Lords and the Judicial Committee and changed 
the person of the Speaker. 
 Executive function 3.7
The executive function is very broad, encapsulating matters 
such as the initiating and implementing legislation, maintaining order and 
security, public services, international relationships, and promoting public 
welfare.  
Historically the executive function was performed by the monarch, 
but now the power has shifted into the hands of the Prime minister and other 
ministers, who together form the Government. Tasks such as maintaining order 
and security may be performed by other bodies, such as the police and the armed 
forces. Devolved
71
 organs in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland have also 
been granted the executive function and since the UK is a part of the EU, 
executive powers also belong to the Council and the Commission.
72
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 Overlapping powers 3.8
The intent of the doctrine of the separation of powers is for no one organ 
to hold more than one power, but as was mentioned before, the separation 
of powers in the UK is far from complete.  
Legislature and executive 
The House of Commons, as a part of legislature, controls the executive 
since it can effectively withdraw its support of government, which is then forced 
to resign (governed by the system of checks and balances – constitutional 
convention).
73
 However, if the Cabinet has the support it has a rather extended 
control over the work of the Commons. Members of the Government are also 
members of the House of Commons, which allows them to use their voting power 
there, but as such, they are heavily outnumbered.  
Legislature and judiciary, judiciary and executive 
Prior to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, these powers overlapped 
in the person of the Lord Chancellor who was the head of the judiciary, member 
of the cabinet as well as a member of the House of Lords. In Judicial Committee, 
which was historically an executive organ which at the same time functioned 
as the court of law and Law Lords who were a part of the House of Lords 
as well as members of the Court of Appeal. After the CRA came to force, these 
issues were resolved by altering the position of the Lord Chancellor and Law 
Lords, an abolition of the Judicial Committee and creation of the Supreme 
Court.
74
  
  
                                                 
73
 CAVENDISH PUBLISHING LIMITED. Constitutional Law. 4. vyd. Great Britain: Cavendish 
Publishing Limited, 2004, s. 24. ISBN 1-85941-941-0. 
74
 BRADLEY, A.W. a K.D. EWING. Constitutional and administrative law. 15. vyd. Great 
Britain: Longman, 2010, s. 84-89. ISBN 978-1405873505. 
34 
 
4 Constitutional changes, progress of the Bill 
The Constitution of the UK has undergone a long process of development, 
but never have the changes been as frequent as in the past twenty years. When 
the Labour party assumed the office in 1997, various committees were established 
and started to propose broad constitutional changes in the areas of elections, 
voting, funding political parties, administration, the House of Lords and the House 
of Commons, devolution to Scotland and Wales and so on. This resulted 
in enacting important constitutional legislation such as the Scotland Act 1998, 
the Northern Ireland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 1998, the Human 
Rights Act 1998 and many others. The Constitutional Reform Policy Committee 
has overseen these activities and European Legislation greatly influenced 
the development.75 This chapter will further introduce these changes which 
ultimately lead to the proposal of the Constitutional Reform Bill in 2003 
and the process the Bill has undergone to become an Act of Parliament. 
 Devolution 4.1
Devolution is the process of creating subordinate legislatures 
and assemblies, a process of decentralization, which is meant to put the citizen 
closer to the source of power.76 For Northern Ireland, devolved government was 
the goal since its separation from Ireland but it gained more attention when 
the Scottish National Party and Welsh National Party emerged in 1970s.77 
After unsuccessful attempts of legislative devolution in 1974-1979, 
the devolution of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales took place in 1998 
after referendums held in 1997. During this process, some legislative power 
previously held by the Parliament of the UK was given to the newly formed 
Parliament of Scotland, and Assemblies of Wales and Northern Ireland. Since the 
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Parliament of the UK is still sovereign, it may however repeal its Acts at any 
time.78  
Devolution is an important aspect of the new British Constitution as it 
effectively changed its form from a unitary state to a multi-national one. 
The intention was to resolve the issues arising between the individual nations 
in the UK as well as the expanding economy.  
Whether that was successful is in my opinion rather questionable, 
especially since the latest development – namely the Scotland‘s independence 
referendum in 2014, which even though it remained unsuccessful, gained 
the votes of 1,6 million (44%) of Scots with a 86% turnout.79 A turnout of this 
magnitude is unheard of in Czech Republic and is, I believe, not the last of its 
kind. Northern Ireland‘s Sinn Fein80 has also been committed to becoming 
united with the rest of Ireland, and perhaps the Scottish referendum will even 
aid its attempts to do so. 
 House of Lords reform 4.2
The House of Lords has been reformed considerably since 1997, when 
the plan to remove the right of hereditary peers to sit and vote in the House was 
announced. Firstly, in 1999 when the House of Lords Act came into force, 
the number of hereditary peers was reduced by more than 600. Shortly 
after, in 2000, the House of Lords Appointment Commission was established 
with the agenda of approving and recommending new candidates for the Lords. 
In 2007, the White Paper was published which introduced a new plan – 50% 
of Lords were now to be elected and 50% were to be appointed. When this 
proposition was put to vote, the Commons had supported the election, while 
the Lords voted for a fully appointed House. This plan was revisited again 
in 2012, when the Joint Committee published a report recommending that 80% 
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of Lords should be elected, while the rest will remain appointed but dropped 
in September of 2012 when Deputy prime minister announced its withdrawal.
81
 
The House of Lords reform was meant to resolve two issues – its 
composition and its power. The composition did somewhat change, but the fact 
remains that the Lords are still not becoming a more representative sample 
of the population. Until 1999, the issue of the power of the Lords was governed 
by the Salisbury convention from 1947, which stated that Lords should not use 
their powers, but merely ensure that the Commons could legislate (the Lords only 
stopped 4 Bills in this time). This balance of power changed after the reform, 
as the Salisbury convention lost some of its power. As for the proposed electoral 
system, the primacy of the Commons was a concern. However, the Government 
stated that other countries, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, or Japan, have 
wholly elected second chambers, but the primary chamber still has the power 
to override their decision.
82
  
The reform of Lords is still under debate, and in my opinion, I do not think 
that its current composition will be able to hold on much longer. 
 House of Commons reform 4.3
House of Commons was not directly reformed. Rather, it was modernised 
by removing out-dated practices and rules, creating an easier access to Parliament 
(including creating a website for the Commons), reorganising of work hours, 
and easing the legislative programmes.
83
  
In 1994, the guidelines governing the conduct of MPs were changed.  This 
subject was revisited again in 2009 when inflated and fraudulent expenses of MPs 
came to light. Their regular salary was 65, 000 pounds, but this could come 
up to 100, 000 pounds for office expenses. However, it was discovered that many 
of the MPs maximised their financial gain in contrary to what the Green Book 
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for Members
84
 allowed. These actions of course caused a public scandal to which 
the Parliament responded with the Parliamentary Standards Act in 2009.
85
 
 Human Rights Act 1998 4.4
In 1998, the Human Rights Act was enacted and changed the British 
constitutional practice fundamentally. It meant codifying protections contained 
previously in the European Convention only into UK law. All public bodies 
or bodies carrying out public functions must uphold these protections. It does not 
only affect the public authority, but also individuals who can now argue their 
human rights cases in the European Court of Human Rights. The rights protected 
by the HRA include the right to life, fair trial, liberty and security, protection 
of family life and many others.
86
 
As mentioned before, the HRA imposed limitations on the previously 
sovereign Parliament. Article 19 (1) of the Act says that a minister 
in charge of the Bill must, before Second Reading, either issue a statement 
of compatibility or a statement that he wishes the House to proceed even though 
the Bill is not compatible. The judiciary now also needs to take into consideration 
the decisions made by the Commission, Committee, and the European Court 
on Human Rights as well as interpret the Acts in the light of the ECHR 
declaration. The courts under HRA gained the power to issue a declaration 
of incompatibility, in the event that they found a provision of primary legislation 
incompatible with the Convention rights.
87
 
The HRA is, in the British way, the closest thing they now possess 
to the bill of rights and it revolutionised understanding of law. It strengthened 
the position of judiciary and made it, as well as the Parliament and Government, 
much more capable of protecting the human rights.  
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4.4.1 The Human Rights Act, sovereignty and rule of law 
Even though the courts were granted the power to declare incompatibility, 
simply doing so does not invalidate the primary legislation. This means that 
the sovereignty of Parliament still applies as the ultimate decision about the future 
of the legislation is still in its power.
88
 
As for the rule of law, the purpose of the Act is to preserve the main 
democratic principle and secure the human rights culture. The balance between 
these doctrines is dependent on compromise between the two. If the judges 
attempted to make the judiciary supreme over Parliament, using the judicial 
review, they would surely meet with an intense disapproval. At the same time, if 
the Parliament ignored the declarations of incompatibility and chose not to repeal 
the statutes, the HRA would have close to no value. If this compromise is not 
being upheld, a clash between judiciary and legislature may occur. The difficulty 
of balancing these powers is seen in the amendments proposed by the Prime 
Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in 2006, which arose mainly 
in connection with the issues of asylum and terrorism.
89
  
In conclusion – the HRA upholds both doctrines by increasing the power 
of the courts upholding the rule of law principles and leaving the final decision 
of repeal to the Parliament. This will remain balanced as long as the courts do not 
attempt to exceed their power and the Parliament respects the rule of law 
by repealing Acts declared as incompatible. 
 Judicial reform 4.5
In 1998, the legislature was devolved and the HRA passed. This only 
strengthened the issue of the lack of separation of powers, especially in the person 
of the Lord Chancellor who held all three powers. Law Lords, who with the Lord 
Chancellor formed the Appellate Committee of the Lords (judicial function), sat 
in the House of Lords and to whom the devolved legislature was being referred 
to, also needed to undergo change. 
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As a reaction to these and many other arising issues, in June 2003, three 
Consultation papers were issued as a base of the Constitutional Reform Bill.90 
 Proposal of the Constitutional Reform Bill 2003 4.6
Professor Vernon Bogdanor described the numerous reforms since 1997 
as an era of constitutional reform and the CRA continued the trend. 
Its policy was formulated in 2001 and consecutively the Minister and his 
Department proposed matters to be discussed in the collective consideration, 
which was the task of a Cabinet Sub-Committee. The proposals formed 
by the Committee were published in a Green Paper (which offers for the matters 
to be redefined), and later a White Paper (which contains a firm proposal).91 
On June 12 2003 Tony Blair, the then Prime minister, announced plans 
to implement constitutional reforms and created the Department for Constitutional 
Affairs and the position of Secretary of State, which replaced the post of the Lord 
Chancellor, as its head.92 The House of Lords expressed its dismay 
about the circumstances in which the Government introduced this policy. 
According to them, the announcement was made by the Government without 
the understanding of the post of the Lord Chancellor and without any kind 
of consultation outside of the government.93 The three Consultation Papers 
proposed mainly the creation of a Supreme Court, the Judicial Appointment 
Commission and the abolition of the post of Lord Chancellor. The Bill itself was 
introduced to the House of Lords on 24th February 2004. 94 
During the Second Reading of the Bill, a number of speakers referred 
the Bill to a Select Committee, a very rare practice for a Governmental bill rather 
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than to a Committee of the Whole House for a more detailed examination. 
The Select Committee included 400 amendments that were intended to clarify 
and improve the Bill while remaining true to its original structure. 95 In the Select 
Committee, an agreement was reached concerning 44 issues, but the creation 
of the Supreme Court as well as the abolishment of the Lord Chancellor‘s post 
resulted in defeat for the government. 96 
As the Government was committed to the contents of the Bill, it made 
the legislative process more difficult than necessary, with many instances 
of individual proposals being examined more than once. Since the changes it 
proposed were directly aimed at the person of the Lord Chancellor and the House 
of Lords, it also put a strain on their relationship with the government. 97 
4.6.1 The Lord Chancellor 
The most controversial element introduced in the Consultation Papers was 
surely the abolition of the post of the Lord Chancellor and his replacement 
with the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs. The reason for this was 
to ensure that judges are protected from political pressure and that their 
independence is remains free from the influence of the executive.98 The members 
of the Lord Chancellor‘s Department were astounded by the proposed abolition 
of their department as neither they, nor the Lord Chancellor were consulted 
on the matter at all. The Lord Chancellor himself found about the change 
in The Times. Lord Irivine, the then Lord Chancellor, also submitted a paper 
to Tony Blair in which he expressed his dismay and stressed that such a change 
would have a great influence on both primary and secondary legislation. He 
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himself held about 5,000 different functions at the time.99 Lord Irvine was 
strongly opposed to the changes was dismissed by Tony Blair in 2003 and was 
replaced by Lord Falconer as the first State Secretary for Constitutional Affairs.100  
The Select Committee was questioning whether the office should be 
abolished or how could it be refined and retained. It also questioned 
the replacement of the Lord Chancellor with the person of Secretary of State 
for Constitutional Affairs as the Prime Minister could choose a person without 
a law background and a member of the Commons rather than the Lords. The view 
of the Committee was that such a person should continue to be a senior lawyer 
and a member of the Lords without any political career aspirations. 101 
After the debate in the Lords, the proposal changed and the Bill itself 
suggested only its reformulation into the post of Secretary of State 
for Constitutional Affairs. After further discussions, it was decided that the title 
Lord Chancellor would remain, but the powers available to him would be 
decreased. Instead of the Lord Chancellor, it would be the Lord Chief Justice who 
would become the head of the judiciary, as well as the President of Courts 
of England.  
The Concordat was the cornerstone of the new relationship between 
the two branches – executive and judiciary. It was thanks to the Concordat that 
the tension between the two decreased. The Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief 
Justice would meet regularly to discuss the roles of their posts, and their 
agreements were incorporated directly into the CRA. The Concordat established 
that the role of the head of the judiciary would now be the task of the Lord Chief 
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Justice and it formulated the basis for the new partnership of the two powers, both 
of which were to have equal influence.102 
4.6.2 Judicial appointments 
Historically it was one of the Lord Chancellor‘s powers to appoint regular 
judges, whereas the Prime Minister appointed judges for the Court of Appeal 
and the House of Lords on his recommendation. Since one of the most important 
changes proposed by the Bill was to alter the powers of the Lord Chancellor, this 
was no longer a desirable concept to the Government. 
During its examination, the Committee focused on several issues 
concerning judicial appointments. One of these was the recommending of judges 
by the Appointments Commission. They found this to be inappropriate, as it was 
the Minister who had the power to make appointments, rather than 
the Commission. The recommending Commission proposed by the Government 
was not well received.  However, the hybrid model proposed by the Lord 
Chancellor, which suggested that the AC would appoint the junior judiciary 
and make recommendations to the Secretary of State (who was meant to replace 
him in the appointment process) for the more senior appointments, was successful 
amongst the Law Society103 and some of the Committee. The Law Society also 
acknowledged the need for democratic accountability for more senior 
appointments.104 
As the abolition of the post of Lord Chancellor was later revoked, new 
discussions arose. The members of the judiciary were of the opinion that 
the executive should not be involved in this process at all, while others thought it 
was important to have a link between the democratic process 
and the appointments (the link was secured by the influence of the elected 
Parliament).  
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The Bill proposed that both the Supreme Court Commission 
and the Judicial Appointments Commission would have the decision-making 
power. They would both suggest one candidate to be appointed, whose name 
could be rejected by the Lord Chancellor only in certain circumstances. This 
means that the Parliament plays no role in judicial appointments, but it still has 
the power to remove errant senior judges.105 
4.6.3 Supreme Court 
Even before the Bill was introduced, others were calling for the creation 
of a Supreme Court.  Professor Andrew Le Sueur and Richard Cornes argued that 
there was a case for reform because the HRA, in its 6th Article, guarantees 
an independent and impartial hearing. Law Lord Steyn suggested the creation 
of a Supreme Court as ―an independent of other branches of government, 
in the framework of our existing system in which the supremacy of Parliament is 
the paramount principle of our constitution”; and so did Lord Bingham, in his 
lecture A New Supreme Court for the United Kingdom. In the Government‘s 
consultation paper, Constitutional Reform: a Supreme Court for the United 
Kingdom , published in 2003, it was proposed to move the function 
of the Appellate Committee of Lords to a new separate Supreme Court. This 
matter was revised on by the Constitutional Affairs Committee, which agreed 
on the creation of the Supreme Court but called for a delay in its implementing 
and also called for a draft form of the plan to be published. Finally, 
the Government, on 9 February 2004, made a statement to the Lords in which it 
introduced the plans for the Supreme Court and the Bill was introduced.106 
According to Part 3, the Supreme Court of the UK was meant to consist 
of 12 judges appointed by the Queen. The First members would be the existing 
Lords of Appeal in (the Law Lords of House of Lords) and their senior would 
become the President of the Court and second senior the Deputy President. 
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The future members were required to have held high judicial office for at least 2 
years or have been a qualifying practitioner for at least 15 years.107 
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5 Constitutional Reform Act 2005 
The Act received royal assent on 24 March 2005 and came into force 
in 2006. It contains 149 sections and 18 Schedules. Since its revolutionary 
character and relatively unexpected introduction in 2003, the Act required much 
debate in both Houses and rather lengthy and extensive debate in the Select 
Committee. Because of this, the legislative process took two entire years.  
„An Act to make provision for modifying the office of Lord Chancellor, 
and to make provision relating to the functions of that office; to establish 
a Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, and to abolish the appellate jurisdiction 
of the House of Lords; to make provision about the jurisdiction of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council and the judicial functions of the President 
of the Council; to make other provision about the judiciary, their appointment 
and discipline; and for connected purposes.“ 108 
The CRA may be the „single most fundamental and radical 
change…in over three hundred years. “109 It intended to move 
away from the overlapping powers so typical for the British Constitution 
and towards the more traditional separation of powers. It brought profound 
structural changes especially for the judiciary, which is now more independent 
than ever and has a more distinct identity.
110
 
 Rule of law 5.1
Under Section 1 of the Act this Act does not adversely affect— 
(a) The existing constitutional principle of the rule of law, or 
(b) The Lord Chancellor‘s existing constitutional role in relation to that 
principle.111 
Democratic values can only be secured by the application of the rule 
of law and it needs to be upheld in order for there to be an independent judiciary 
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protected mainly from the influence of the executive. By proclaiming the rule 
of law as an existing constitutional principle, the CRA is attempting to secure 
and strengthen its position. This is seen in the increasing independence 
of the judiciary in parts 3 and 4 of the Act. 
 Lord Chancellor 5.2
The CRA sought for a clearer separation of powers which was defied 
in the person of the Lord Chancellor and it noticeably restricted and transferred 
his powers. The CRA continued a trend set out by other constitutional reforms, 
mainly the HRA. Prior to the reform the Lord Chancellor had a hybrid role 
and complex responsibilities acquired over an extended period of time – senior 
judge who sat on the Appellate Committee, member of the cabinet and 
the Speaker of Lords. Even though the Lord Chancellor possessed all these 
powers, constitutional conventions served as their limitation. For example, 
they prevented the Lord Chancellor from having an entirely political role 
by limiting his power to sit as judge at a panel of the Lords in politically 
controversial cases. His law background was considered very important, as he was 
the voice of the judiciary in the Cabinet, which served as a protection 
of the judiciary from the executive.112 
Lord Falconer113 said about the post of the Lord Chancellor, ―having 
a leader of the judges drawn from the judiciary rather than a politician drives 
a sense of ownership and momentum. It gives judiciary confidence that 
the pressure for change, if it comes from the head of judiciary, comes 
from the profession and not from the politicians.”114 
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His office represented important constitutional values and was respected 
greatly, which is why the proposed abolition of the office did not meet with great 
success and why the position had been retained. 115   
Effective as of July 4th 2006, the Lord Chancellor was replaced 
by an elected Speaker in the House of Lords and the Lord Chief Justice became 
the head of the judiciary. 116 
5.2.1 CRA on Lord Chancellor 
Part 2 of the Act – Arrangements to modify the office of the Lord 
Chancellor consists of sections 2-22. It considers, amongst other topics, 
the qualifications for office of the Lord Chancellor, continued judicial 
independence; the judiciary and courts in England and Wales, the judiciary 
and courts in Northern Ireland as well as functions subject to transfer, 
modification, or abolition. 
 Qualifications for the office of Lord Chancellor 5.2.1.1
Section 2 of the Act says that any person who seems qualified 
by experience, in the opinion of the Prime Minister, may be appointed as the Lord 
Chancellor. By experience, it means ministerial, parliamentary, judicial, legal 
experience or any other relevant experience. 117 
 Continued judicial independence 5.2.1.2
Section 3 guarantees continued judicial independence by stating that 
the persons responsible for matters of the judiciary or administration of justice 
must uphold the continued independence of judiciary, nor can the Lord Chancellor 
or other Ministers influence judicial decisions. The Lord Chancellor himself must 
defend the independence and support the judiciary to enable them to exercise their 
functions and make sure that the public interest is represented properly 
with regards to the judiciary and administration of justice.118 
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 Judiciary and courts in England and Wales, Other provisions 5.2.1.3
about the judiciary and courts 
Section 7 replaced the Lord Chancellor as the head of Judiciary of England 
and Wales with the Lord Chief Justice. The Lord Chief Justice then became 
responsible for representing the views of the judiciary to Parliament 
and the Ministers, who will use the resources made available by the Lord 
Chancellor to train and guide the judiciary of England and Wales, and who will 
deploy the judiciary and allocate the work within courts.  
According to sections 8 and 9, it will be the Lord Chief Justice who, 
after consultation with Lord Chancellor, will be naming senior judges. 
With the consultations of the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice will also 
have the power to make the rules for the procedures of courts (section 12), 
and the power to issue practice directions supplementary to procedural rules 
(section 13).  
Under the Section 14 and Schedule 3, the appointment functions would be 
transferred to Her Majesty.119 
The relocation and modification of powers is included in section 15 
and schedule 4, which is by far the longest with its 100 pages. Schedule 4 amends 
numerous Acts when it comes to the person of the Lord Chancellor, for example 
the Habeas Corpus Act 1679, the Pluralities Act 1838, the Public Notaries Act 
1843, the Judicial Committee Act 1915, the Administration of Justice Act 1970, 
the Armed Forces Act 1976 and many others. These only illustrate the broad 
power of the Lord Chancellor, and the enormous change that the CRA brought 
to all branches of law.120 
 Functions subject to transfer, modification or abolition 5.2.1.4
Section 19 gives Lord Chancellor power to make orders for transfer, 
modification, or abolition of his powers mentioned in Section 14. 
121
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 Supreme Court 5.3
Lord Falconer said, during the debates on the Bill, ―the time has come 
for the UK’s highest court to move out from under the shadow of the legislature… 
the key objective is to achieve a full and transparent separation between 
the judiciary and the legislature… “. 122 Even though the Selection Committee 
was not convinced that the Supreme Court should exist, in 2009 it was established 
as the final court of appeal for both civil and criminal cases, and its agenda is 
to judge cases of the greatest constitutional importance.
123
 
5.3.1 CRA on Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court is established in part 3, sections 23-60, which are 
concerned with its creation, the appointing of judges, terms of their appointment, 
acting judges, jurisdiction, relation to other courts, composition for proceedings, 
practice and procedure, staff and resources, fees and annual report 
Section 23 says that there is to be a Supreme Court of the UK, composed of 12 
judges (the existing Law Lords). The recommendations for an appointment 
for judge of the Supreme Court, President of the Court or the Deputy President 
of the Court are to be made to the Queen by the Prime Minister with the aid of a 5 
membered commission. As well as this, consultations with senior judges, the First 
Minister in Scotland, the Assembly First Secretary in Wales, the Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland and the Lord Chancellor are also required. 
The selection itself must be on merit, and only a person who meets 
the necessary requirements124 and has the knowledge and experience of the law 
of each part of the UK can be selected. 
 Terms of appointment 5.3.1.1
The terms of appointment will be conditioned by an oath of allegiance 
and judicial oath. The tenure of a judge of the Supreme Court will be that he will 
hold the office during good behaviour and he may be removed on the address 
of both Houses of Parliament. The salary will be determined by the Lord 
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Chancellor. A judge of the Supreme Court may also resign at any time (by giving 
a notice in writing to the Lord Chancellor) and can retire for medical reasons.
125
 
 Acting judges 5.3.1.2
Senior territorial judges and the members of the supplementary panel may 
make a request to the President or the Deputy President of the Court to sit 
as a judge after they reach the age of 75.126 
 Jurisdiction, relation to other courts etc. 5.3.1.3
By section 40, schedule 9 will transfer the jurisdiction from the House 
of Lords Judicial Committee of the Privy Council to the Court and will also make 
other amendments relating to jurisdiction. The Supreme Court will hear appeals 
and, for that purpose, will consist of an uneven number of judges (at least 3, half 
of which are permanent). It will also have the power to seek the assistance 
of more specially qualified advisers. The President of the Court, after consultation 
with the Lord Chancellor, will make the Supreme Court rules governing practice 
and procedure. The Lord Chancellor will then decide when these will come 
into force and will include them in a statutory instrument.127 
 Staff and resources 5.3.1.4
The Court will have a chief executive appointed by the Lord Chancellor 
with the consultation of the President of the Court. The President will also appoint 
officers and staff of the court whose numbers will be determined by the chief 
executive with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor will 
also be responsible for the Court‘s accommodation and other resources. 128 
 Fees and annual report 5.3.1.5
The scale for fees will be made by the Lord Chancellor with the agreement 
of the Treasury with regard to the principle of access to the courts.  
A report will be prepared annually by the chief executive and be laid down 
before the Parliament by the Lord Chancellor. 129 
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5.3.2 Lord Phillips on the Supreme Court 
According to Lord Phillips,130 the appointment process is, with its two 
stages, overly elaborate and the Lord Chancellor‘s veto power131 controversial. 
Lord Phillips is of the opinion that the power of veto is actually justified since it 
would not be desirable for the Appointment Commission to appoint a judge 
at the highest level who did not have support of the Government represented 
by the Lord Chancellor.132  
Another thing questioned by Lord Phillips, and prior to him by the Select 
Committee on the Constitution, was the financial independence of the Supreme 
Court.  
In the view of the Select Committee, the integrity of the legal system 
depends on proper funding and they considered it one of the vital tasks 
of the Lord Chancellor. They suggested he should ensure maximum protection 
from budgetary pressures. 133 
Lord Falconer, who was responsible for the budget of the Court, proposed 
a different scheme than the one actually applied in the CRA. He initially said 
“…the Supreme Court will be administered as a distinct constitutional entity. 
Special arrangements will apply to its budgetary and financial arrangements 
in order to reflect its unique status.‖  He also explained how he wanted to achieve 
the financial independence required. He wanted the President of the Supreme 
Court and the chief executive to determine the bid for resources for the Court 
and pass those to the Minister, who would then submit it to the Treasury. 
The Treasury was then to scrutinise the bid and approve it before it went 
to the Commons, who would approve it as a part of overall Estimates. The funds 
were then to be transferred to the Court directly from the Consolidated Fund. This 
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procedure would ensure independence was maintained, that the level of funding 
could not be influenced by Ministers, and that the chief executive, who 
with directions of the President, would be the one responsible for the finances 
in the Court. If we have a look at section 50 (1), it says that The Lord Chancellor 
must ensure that the Supreme Court is provided with the following— 
(a) Such court-houses, offices and other accommodation as the Lord Chancellor 
thinks are appropriate for the Court to carry on its business. 
(b) Such other resources as the Lord Chancellor thinks are appropriate for the 
Court to carry on its business.134 
In Lord Phillip‗s opinion those provisions are not in fact in accordance 
with what Lord Falconer said. Even though the Lord Chancellor did in fact 
provide the Court with a court house, it was under different circumstances 
and the Court now needs to repay the cost of it. The reason the funding was not 
provided in the way Lord Falcon envisioned it was the Treasury, as they did not 
support the idea of a completely free body which they would be dealing 
with directly. The Treasury instead proposed a model which would fund the Court 
from court fees which was considered to be in contrary to the principle of access 
to justice. After rather lengthy debates, it was established that the cost of the Court 
would be funded by the civil business as a whole, and the rest would be provided 
by the Treasury. However, this model does not provide the Court with stable 
and secure funding, nor does it guarantee the institutional independence. 
135
   
Currently, the Supreme Court is dependent on the Department 
of Constitutional Affairs for its funding as well as for an administrative support.
136
 
 Judicial Appointments Discipline 5.4
The judicial selection process has been reformed several times 
before the CRA came into force. The new process introduced by the Act 
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developed after extensive consultations with a large number of academics, 
professional bodies and interest groups and lengthy negotiations in the Parliament. 
Transferring powers to an independent judiciary began on April 3, 2006. The new 
head of the judiciary the Lord Chief Justice assumed his office and replaced 
the Lord Chancellor.
137
  
The main reason for establishing the new Judicial Appointments 
Commission was to separate the judiciary from the executive and eliminate any 
political involvement that the executive may have had.
138
  
In Lord Phillips‘ opinion, the process of judicial appointments was not 
flawed to begin with, even though they were made on the recommendations 
of the Lord Chancellor. The Lord Chancellor‘s Department was searching 
for the most eligible candidates, some of whom never even applied for the post 
themselves and the appointments were based on consultations with judiciary. 
The system was criticised since most of the judiciary consisted of white male 
upper social class judges and because the appointments were made in a non-
transparent process. The CRA reacted to this criticism by creating the Judicial 
Appointments Commission and giving the power of a very limited veto 
to the Lord Chancellor. 
139
 
5.4.1 CRA on Judicial Appointments Discipline 
Part 4, sections 61- 122 are concerned with the new system 
of appointments of judges.  In its 4 chapters, it focuses on the Commission 
and Ombudsman; appointments of Lord Chief Justice and Heads of Division; 
Lords Justices of Appeal; Puisne140 judges and other office holders; complaints 
and references; disciplinary powers and applications for review and references. 
                                                 
137
 MAUTE, Judith L. English reforms to judicial selection: Comparative lessons for American 
states. Fordham Urban Law Journal[online]. 2006, Vol. 34, Iss. 1 [cit. 25.2.2015]. Dostupné 
z: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1949&context=ulj  
138
 HORNE, Alexander. HOME AFFAIRS RESEARCH SECTION. The Changing Constitution: A 
Case for Judicial Confirmation Hearings [pdf]. London, 2010 [cit. 25.2.2015]. Dostupné z: 
http://www.studyofparliament.org.uk/spg-paper-1.pdf 
139
 LORD PHILLIPS. Judicial Independence & Accountability: A View from the Supreme 
Court [pdf]. 2011 [cit. 25.2.2015]. Dostupné z: https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/speech 
_110208.pdf 
140
 a regular member of a court 
54 
 
 Commission and Ombudsman 5.4.1.1
Chapter 1 introduces the new bodies of the Judicial Appointments 
Commission and the Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman.141  
The Commission is further described in Schedule 12, according to which it 
will consist of a lay chairman, 5 judges, 2 practising lawyers, 5 lay members 1 
legal tribunal member and 1 magistrate. The limit of the membership will be 5 
years and the maximum length of membership can last no longer than 10 years.142 
By Schedule 13, the Ombudsman will be recommended by the Lord 
Chancellor and appointed by the Queen. The Ombudsman candidate must not 
have ever held the position of a judge or a practising lawyer. In case he held 
position such as civil servant, MP or a member of Judicial Appointment 
Commission, it must not have been such a position which had made him 
inappropriate for the post of Ombudsman. The post can be held for no longer than 
10 years and the appointment must not be longer than 5 years.143 
 Appointments 5.4.1.2
Chapter 2 contains rules for the appointments of the Lord Chief Justice, 
Heads of Division, the Lord Justices of Appeal and Puisne judges, and other office 
holders. According to section 63(2), the selection must be solely on merit and (3) 
a person must not be selected unless the selecting body is satisfied that he is 
of good character. What is meant by good character is not described anywhere 
in the Act. Section 64(1) says that the Commission, in performing its functions 
under this Part, must have regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range 
of persons available for selection for appointments.144 
As mentioned before, the lack of diversity especially amongst higher 
judiciary was criticised and this Section was meant to prevent that happening 
in the future. Whether it was actually successful will be discussed in chapter 5.  
The Lord Chancellor‘s role in this new process will be mostly consultation 
and it is subject to approval in both Houses of Parliament.145 
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The Committee is thus a recommending body who will present one name 
to the Lord Chancellor who is then going to be the one to appoint the judge. Every 
selection made by the Committee will need to be explained in a written report. 
The report will serve the Lord Chancellor in considering the candidate presented 
to him and annually given to the Parliament.  
The detailed requirements on the composition and selection 
of the Commission are rather significant. Commissioners will be selected 
in an open application process and they will be required to be persons 
of selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, 
and leadership. There will also be a detailed inquiry into their professional 
and personal backgrounds.  
The appointment process will also vary according to the level 
of the appointment. A similar approach will be used for the highest level judges, 
the Lord Chief Justice, the Division Heads and the Lords Justices of Appeal. 
The Lord Chancellor initiates this process, and a panel will perform the selection 
process. The lower level appointments will follow a similar procedure also, but 
the selection will not need to be performed by a panel.146 
The new process laid out in the CRA should also provide more 
transparency in judicial appointments. The Commission was established in 2006. 
147
 
 Complaints and references 5.4.1.3
There are three kinds of complaint introduced under section 99.  
(2) A Commission complaint is a complaint by a qualifying complainant 
of maladministration by the Commission or a committee of the Commission. 
(3) A departmental complaint is a complaint by a qualifying complainant 
of maladministration by the Lord Chancellor or his department in connection 
with any of the following—(a) Selection under this Part; 
(b) Recommendation for or appointment to an office listed in Schedule 14. 
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(4) A qualifying complainant is a complainant who claims to have been adversely 
affected, as an applicant for selection or as a person selected under this Part, 
by the maladministration complained of.148 
These complaints can only be made by a person who claiming he was 
adversely affected in the selection process. The complaints must be made 
within 28 days after the matter of the complained occurred. They will be 
examined by the Commission or the Department and if necessary 
by the Ombudsman. Complaints which do not concern maladministration may be 
made to the Ombudsman at any time. 
149
 
 Discipline 5.4.1.4
The Lord Chancellor has a power to remove a person from an office 
for inability or misbehaviour and he can do so only after compliance 
with prescribed procedures.  
The Lord Chief Justice with the agreement of the Lord Chancellor 
and following agreed procedure will be authorised to give a formal warning 
or reprimand. With the agreement of the Lord Chancellor, he may also suspend 
a person from judicial office who is subject to criminal proceedings, or has 
under certain circumstances been convicted of an offence. With the agreement 
of the Lord Chancellor, he may suspend a senior judge from office while he is 
subject to proceedings for an Address and the holders of other offices while they 
are under investigation for an office or subject to prescribed procedures.  
Suspended person may not perform any of the functions of the office.
150
 
In order for the judges to be independent there also needs to exist a system 
of accountability. This topic will be introduced further in chapter 5. 
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6 Consequences and the impact of the change 
The process of constitutional change was described by the Lord Chancellor 
as, “stripping away confusing traditions, introducing transparent, comprehensible 
systems of governance”. The purpose of the change was to modernize and renew 
democracy to make it more suitable to the world we live in now.  
In the view of Professor Bogdanor, this new constitution is written down, 
embodied in statute and does not rely so heavily on the conventions and tacit 
understandings.
151
 It complements the changes brought by HRA by enhancing 
the independence of the judiciary, isolating the judicial appointments 
from political influence, and removing the highest court of appeal from the House 
of Lords. The judges will no longer be appointed by the members of the executive 
as they were in the past. The character of the British Constitution remains now 
adapted and reformed. The constitutional principles remain as well but they are 
more easily identified. Even though the Parliamentary sovereignty still applies 
and the change the CRA brought can be repealed at any time, right now 
the judiciary is more powerful than before. The rule of law and judicial 
independence are for the first time included in a statutory form. 
The UK has undergone this process without any revolution or radical 
change in the government under the existing legal framework, not because 
of a huge amount of pressure, but because it is taking a pragmatic and long 
view.
152
 
 Changes in the judiciary 6.1
The constitutional change had most substantial effect when it comes 
to the judiciary. In the opinion of the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge, the removal 
of the Lord Chancellor as the head of the judiciary is ―eroding something rather 
important‖ as there is nobody who is able to represent the needs of the judiciary 
to the government.
153
 But even though the judiciary lost their link with Parliament 
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in the person of Lord Chancellor the judges are appearing in front of the Select 
Committee in Parliament instead and The judges communicate with the public 
more directly as their speeches are published on the newly created judicial 
website. 
154
 The power to recommend judicial candidates was stripped from 
the Lord Chancellor and all appointments are going through the Judicial 
Appointments Committee. The complaints are now handled by the Judicial 
Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman. 
155
 
6.1.1 Judicial independence 
The purpose of judicial independence is to make sure that judges can 
perform their duties, protect the citizens from the arbitrary use of power 
of the government and resolve disputes impartially. In the UK, unlike 
in the countries with constitutional courts, the focus is for the courts to uphold 
the rule of law and to protect the human rights. It is not meant to be a privilege 
of the judge but rather their duty and it is necessary to maintain public confidence 
in the system of government.
156
 
The constitutional principle of independent judiciary should not mean that 
the judiciary is to be isolated from other branches of the government or that 
the judiciary should not be accountable. 157 
The reforms the judiciary has undergone strengthened the compliance 
of the UK‘s model with the international standards. In 2003, the Council 
of Europe expressed the issues they found with this principle. As a response, 
the government prepared a Consultation Paper. They identified the issues 
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in the person of Lord Chancellor, the fact that the Law Lords were part 
of the House of Lords and in the fact that there was no independent judicial 
selection body. The changes in the Act were meant to address these issues as well 
as help the public understand the system of judiciary better.158 
In the previous model, the Lord Chancellor played the important role 
of guardian of the judicial independence. The role has now moved to other 
guardians such as the Attorney General, the Government Legal Service, 
and the Parliamentary Counsel. The new Lord Chancellor, Chris Grayling 
as of 2012, has much less power which is due to the fact that he is not a lawyer, 
politician or a Lord.  
In Parliament, the gap has been filled by two new Select Committees – 
the Constitution Committee in the Lords and the Justice Committee 
in the Commons and the Clerks who make sure that the judges are not criticised 
improperly in Parliament. 
In the judiciary, the guardians are now the Lord Chief Justice who 
delegates functions to senior judges; the Senior Presiding Judge; the Senior 
President of Tribunals; the President of the Supreme Court; the chief executive 
of the Supreme Court and guardians for specific functions (e.g. the judge 
in charge of parliamentary relations). The task of the Judicial Communications 
Office is to inform the press about the actions of the judiciary, to fight any 
unjustified criticism and to clarify any possible misunderstandings.  Its task is 
of great importance as ultimately the independence relies on the support 
of the public and very much influenced by the media. 159 
 Is the judiciary more independent under CRA? 6.1.1.1
The research conducted by Robert Hazell160 and presented in Brno in 2014 
showed that the judiciary feel that the change had actually weakened their 
independence and that they miss the old Lord Chancellor who they described 
as a strong figure in the government responsible for representing the judiciary 
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to the Cabinet. According to the professor, their view is clouded as the old Lord 
Chancellors did not always protect the judiciary as well as they should have nor is 
it a post which could have survived in the 21st century, mainly because 
of the international pressure. 
In the professor‘s opinion, the judiciary is much stronger in many ways. 
Firstly, the courts have expanded significantly under the CRA 
and under the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007. All appointments 
made to Tribunals are made independent from the government and thanks to their 
incorporation the judiciary grew by more than a half to about 5,600 judges.   
Secondly, the judicial appointments are no longer the responsibility 
of the executive (the Lord Chancellor) but one of the judiciary. Even though it is 
the new Judicial Appointments Commission who makes the recommendations, 
the whole process is heavily influenced by the judiciary via the consultation 
with the Lord Chief Justice. It is the judges who prepare the qualifying tests, write 
the references and sit on the panels that interview candidates.  
The creation of the Supreme Court has also helped the independence 
by separating the Law Lords as part of Lords, and helped make the judiciary 
into a self-governing branch of government.161 
 Judicialization of politics 6.1.1.2
The process of judicialization of politics is a phenomenon in all advanced 
democracies. It can be explained as, “…the growing influence of the courts 
on public policy and political decision making, fuelled by the growth 
of international and European as well as domestic law.” The judges have become 
much more publicly exposed to the media and to Parliament. A great help 
in the communication with the public was creating new websites for the judiciary 
and the Supreme Court and the use of twitter on which they explain their role 
or the significance of their decisions. Sometimes, when these means 
of communication fail to work, the judiciary use a public occasion to express 
an opinion that the government did not take into consideration. 
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The judiciary must now more than ever be politically aware in order 
to gain the public support. This may prove difficult as statistically there are fewer 
lawyers in the Commons and less MP‘s now become judges.  
The judiciary may feel the need to isolate themselves from the world 
of politics especially now since they are a separate body but they do in fact 
depend on the politicians for support and resources and so they should increase 
their effort to become closer with the political branches. As for the politicians, 
they should also seek more communication with the lawyers and the courts 
in order to understand the role of judiciary better.162 
In conclusion, the increased separation of politics from the judiciary  
brought by the CRA was a necessary step needed to achieve greater independence 
from the government163. This greater separation should not, however, be a reason 
for the judiciary to cease communication with other branches of power as such 
communication is necessary in order for the whole system of government 
to function. 
 Judicial accountability 6.1.1.3
Even though judicial accountability is required it should not mean that 
the judges would be directly accountable to the executive or Parliament for their 
decision. Accountability is secured instead by public court hearings, adversarial 
judicial proceedings, judicial decisions which deal with the submissions presented 
by individuals parties of the dispute and the fact that most decisions may 
be appealed. On the matter of the Supreme Court, the accountability is secured 
by proceedings at the European Court of Human Rights.164 
Another way to identify means of judicial accountability was created 
by Andrew Le Sueur. These are ―publication of an annual report by the court; 
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rights of appeal to higher courts; academic commentary on particular judgments 
and the conduct of courts; scrutiny of the judicial appointments process; robust 
and accurate reporting on judgments in the news media; and, education 
by the Bar and other legal professional organisations.”165  
The judiciary has become more accountable under the CRA. The judicial 
system is now much more transparent and the judges themselves are more 
accountable in the disciplinary sense as well. Annual reports are required 
from the Courts and Tribunals Service, the annual Judicial and Court Statistic, 
the Judicial Appointments Commission, the Office for Judicial Complaints, 
Judicial Appointments and Conduct Ombudsman, the Supreme Court 
and the Senior President of Tribunals. Between 2003 and 2013, 148 appearances 
by the judges mainly as expert witnesses have been recorded. 
As for the complaints about judges coming from the litigants, the Judicial 
Conduct Investigation Office took place of the Judicial Correspondence Section 
of the Lord Chancellor‘s Department. It can impose sanctions such as a dismissal 
or a formal warning. The National Audit Office is responsible of the investigations 
on the administrative conduct of the judiciary.  
Other ways to secure accountability are the judicial review 
and in the matter of judicial appointments the Judicial and Conduct Ombudsman.  
Richard Hazell considers two shortcomings of the new system. First 
of these being the failure of the Lord Chief Justice to provide an annual report. 
Second is the lack of Parliament‘s involvement in the judiciary in cases of their 
failings. This could only be fixed by changing the Parliament‘s approach 
and the will to scrutinise the judiciary in case they do fail in fulfilling their 
duties.166   
6.1.2 Diversity in the judiciary 
As mentioned above, the fact that British judiciary consisted almost 
exclusively of older white males from similar backgrounds was a centre 
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of criticism. Many of them were considered biased and out-of-touch 
by the public.
167
 
The CRA itself implemented Section 64, encouraging the diversity 
of judges. In 1998, 10% of judges were black or Asian and 10% were women
168
, 
in 2006, about 14% of judicial posts were given to black and Asian applicants, 
41% to women. In 2008, after the Judicial Appointments Committee took over it 
was 8% to black and Asian applicants and only 34% to women. Lord Irvine, 
the last Lord Chancellor before the implemented changes, made sure to encourage 
minority candidates
169
 but the Commission has not had a great success 
so far when it comes to senior judiciary. That in turn affects the applications 
for appointment to the Supreme Court. In 2011 out of 12 judges, only one was 
a woman. Since the Supreme Court decides matters important for the whole 
of society, it would be appropriate to have a more balanced composition.
170
  
Concerns about the new selection system have been raised since 
the diversity, especially the diversity of the newly appointed senior judges, seems 
to have reduced. Another issue is the length of the process and the fact that 
currently the President and the Deputy President of the Supreme Court actually 
select their own successor.
171
  
Between 2009 and 2013, nearly half of appointments made 
by the Committee were women but in 2014, the report by the Council of Europe 
showed that women were still only 25% of judges in England and Wales.
172
 When 
ethnicity is considered, in 2014 2% Asian 0,8% black judges are employed 
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at Courts and 7,3% Asian and 1,8% black judges are employed at the Tribunals. 
All together 9,4% court and tribunal officeholders are from an ethnic minority 
background.
173
  
As of 2015, the Supreme Court still only has one female.
174
 
 Lord Chancellor 6.2
The CRA originally intended to remove the post of Lord Chancellor 
altogether but it settled for removing him as the head of judiciary 
and the Speaker of the Lords. Under the CRA, the Lord Chancellor only needs 
to be a member of the Parliament but it is no longer required for him to be 
a member of the Lords or to have a legal career. In order to achieve a greater 
separation of powers many of his functions have been transferred to the Lord 
Chief Justice. 
Even though many of his powers have been stripped away, he retained 
many important executive functions.  
The Lord Chancellor is the Cabinet minister and the head of the newly 
created Ministry of Justice and a Secretary of State for Justice. As such, he is 
responsible for the administration and funding of courts and, as of 2007, 
also for the prison service. He also has a duty to respect and maintain judicial 
independence.175 
The Select Committee on the Constitution in their 11th report stated that they do 
not think that the posts of Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice 
should be separated in future. They support the idea of Lord Chancellor who 
would follow the rule of law and support the judiciary with the proper authority 
of the post.176 
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In the past, the position of the Lord Chancellor was the peak of a legal 
and political career. After gaining such a position there was no further advance 
in the terms of career and its holder had nothing to gain or lose by defending 
the judiciary in front of the executive. Now the Lord Chancellor could be seeking 
to gain a higher office. Since the requirements on the person of the Lord 
Chancellor had changed, it is also possible that the future Lord Chancellors will 
be rather mediocre in performing their duties. It is also questionable whether 
the future Lord Chancellors will be willing to defend the judiciary as vigorously 
as in the past.177 
Section 2 of the Act also says that the Lord Chancellor may be appointed if 
the Prime Minister considers him to be qualified by experience. This does not 
prevent the Prime Minister from appointing whomever he pleases. It could also 
make it even more difficult for the Lord Chancellor to stand up for the judiciary 
as he may need to confront other ministers and disagree with them publicly.178 
6.2.1 Relationship between judiciary and executive 
With regards to the changing post of the Lord Chancellor, the Select 
Committee on the Constitution in its 6
th
 report focused on the relationship 
between the executive and judiciary. The Committee conducted a series 
of interviews with various Lords and members of the Lords. Their opinions varied 
but they mostly agreed that to a certain degree a bit of tension between the two 
branches of government is healthy or even proper. 
Even though a certain amount of pressure is acceptable, means for its 
management must exist. The Lord Chancellor was historically a bridge between 
these two powers and now this responsibility is anchored under section 17 
of the CRA as the need to respect the rule of law, defend the independence 
of the judiciary and to ensure the provision of resources for the efficient 
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and effective support of the courts.
179
 I have introduced the topic of funding 
in the previous chapter and now I will focus on the need to defend 
the independence of the judiciary. 
The duty of the Lord Chancellor to uphold the independence is stronger 
than of any other minister or a member of the government. The Lord Chancellor 
must take steps to prevent an action contrary to the rule of law or other 
constitutional principle. He must defend the judiciary against any restriction 
of independence proposed by Government and explain to the Cabinet how such 
restriction could undermine it. The Lord Chancellor must also prevent any 
personal attacks on the judges, especially those coming from the ministers. It was 
the opinion of Lord Phillips that it is in fact necessary for the Lord Chancellor 
to be the one making public statements defending the judiciary, rather than 
for the Lord Chief Justice since that would risk a high profile dispute.
180
 
 Craig Sweeney case 6.2.1.1
Shortly after the CRA was enacted, Lord Falconer was put to the first big 
test when it comes to the relationship of judiciary and executive. Unfortunately, 
this test resulted in a failure.  
In 12 June 2006, Craig Sweeney was sentenced to life imprisonment 
for abducting and sexually assaulting a three-year-old girl. Judge Griffith 
Williams granted him a parole with a minimum of five years and stated that 
Sweeney would only be released in case that there was no more risk of him re-
offending. The Home Secretary John Reid attacked this sentence and asked 
the Attorney-General, Lord Goldsmith, to re-examine the case. This was in fact 
a non-direct attack on the competence of Judge Williams. The spokesman 
of the Attorney-General stated, ―The Attorney will make a decision purely 
on the merits of the case and not in response to political or public pressure‖ and 
criticised John Reid‘s comments.  
Lord Goldsmith stated that „The judge did what he could to protect 
the public from this dangerous man by passing a life sentence on him. This means 
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he will not be released unless and until the Parole Board is satisfied that it would 
be safe to do so. It will now be its responsibility to make that judgment. The judge 
was, however, also required to set a "minimum term", that is to say a term 
before the Parole Board could even consider that question. In setting that term, he 
acted within existing sentencing guidance and law. Given his history, Sweeney 
may never be released. “181 
While the Attorney-General and the former Attorney-General Lord Morris 
of Aberavon both defended judge Griffith, the Prime Minister‘s spokesman, Jack 
Straw the Leader of the Commons as well as other MP‘s defended John Reid 
and the media branded the judiciary as deluded and out-of-touch. It wasn‘t 
until 15 June that the Lord Chancellor appeared on the BBC‘s Questions Time 
and finally defended Judge Griffith. However, at the same time he also defended 
John Reid stating that he did not in fact attack the judge. Lord Falconer also had 
to make his junior minister Vera Baird apologise for her comments on the case.  
The Sweeney case showed that the relationship between the executive 
and judiciary was not at the time working as well as it should have mainly 
because of very much delayed response of the Lord Chancellor and because 
of the inappropriate behaviour of the ministers who are not supposed to be 
commenting on decisions of individual judges in such a manner. The Committee 
also recommended that the Prime Minister insert stronger guidelines which would 
set out the principles governing public commentaries of the ministers 
on the judiciary.182 
In his letter to the Circuit judges from 19 June 2006, Lord Phillips shared 
with them his concern about the media coverage of the case. In his opinion, 
the judiciary was not supposed to be accused and expressed his sympathy 
for Judge Griffith. He admitted that the media should be given the opportunity 
to criticise judiciary but only if such criticism is accurate and objective.183 
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 Supreme Court 6.3
In October 2009, the Supreme Court took the place of the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords, as well as of the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council. It is completely separate from the Government 
and Parliament and consists of 12 Justices.   
The task of the Court is to hear appeals for the most important cases 
concerning public for both civil and criminal cases as well the cases on devolution 
matters. The decisions of these cases have a great impact on the public 
as well as the official bodies of the government. 184 
The Supreme Court and the Appellate Committee are broadly similar 
and the Court overtook the jurisdiction of the Committee. It was not 
set up as a constitutional court even though it hears cases which may raise 
constitutional issues and it does not have the power of constitutional review. 
The Justices are appointed by a special selection commission 
with the consultation of the First Minister in Scotland, the Welsh Assembly and 
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The Lord Chancellor then approves 
the commission‘s choice unless he decides to use his power of veto. The Justices 
have the title of Lord but they are not able to sit in the Lords.185  
About 50% of the cases it hears are public law cases which make 
the independence of the Court very important as some of the cases challenge 
the legality of the actions of executive. The Court is responsible for maintaining 
balance between the executive and judiciary. The ministers have been questioning 
the power of judicial review and Lord Howard186 stated, ―The power of the judges, 
as opposed to the power of elected politicians, has increased, is increasing 
and ought to be diminished. More and more decisions are being made 
by unelected, unaccountable judges, instead of accountable, elected Members 
of Parliament who have to answer to the electorate for what has happened‖. 
In Lord Phillip‘s view, this is a failure to understand the judiciary.  
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The independence of the Court must be balanced by the accountability 
of the judges. Under the CRA, a new disciplinary system has been implemented 
and no sanction can be imposed without the agreement of the Lord Chancellor 
and the Lord Chief Justice. 
The decisions of Supreme Court are not subject to appeal within the UK 
but can appeal is possible to the Strasbourg Court.187 
6.3.1 Parliamentary sovereignty and the Supreme Court 
In 2004, the Government introduced new legislation proposing 
the exclusion of the judiciary from deciding certain appeal cases concerning 
asylum and immigration. The senior judges and academics protested 
and suggested that if that came to pass, they would be entitled, for the first time, 
to ignore an Act of Parliament and questioned the purpose of courts which would 
be effectively inaccessible under this legislation. In 2005, another case questioned 
the sovereignty. The Appellate Committee decided that even though the Hunting 
Act 2004 was a valid statute under the 1949 Parliament Act it also concluded that 
the Parliament‘s power to make laws was limited in case it attempts to abolish 
judicial review and stated that ―the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords 
or a new Supreme Court may have to consider whether this is a constitutional 
fundamental which even a sovereign Parliament acting at the behest 
of a compliant House of Commons cannot abolish.‖188 
This rather important judgment raises a question whether there is 
a transition from the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty to the doctrine 
of constitutional supremacy.  
The constitutionalization of public law, especially under the HRA 
and the devolved legislation, is also raising questions about the role of the higher 
profile judiciary.189   
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 Ministry of Justice 6.4
On 9 May 2007, the Ministry of Justice was created and it took over some 
of the responsibilities of the Home Office and the entire Department 
for Constitutional Affairs. The responsibilities of the MoJ include criminal law 
and sentencing, the prison system, probation, and reducing re-offending. 
Even though the agenda to create MoJ has been around since 2004, 
the creation itself took the judiciary by surprise as the leak in The Sunday 
Telegraph on 21 January 2007 was the first acknowledgment on the part 
of the Government that the Ministry was about to be created. According 
to Professor Bradley, this was not a long term policy of the Government but rather 
a reaction to the problems of the Home Office. Both the Select Committee 
and the judiciary felt it was once again reckless of the Government not to inform 
them of this change earlier on. As with the CRA, the MoJ would have an impact 
on the functioning of the judiciary which the Government failed to acknowledge.  
Questions arose about possible conflict between the Lord Chancellor‘s 
duty to defend the independent judiciary, and the duties he would perform 
as the Secretary of State for justice. Further questions asked would include if 
the existence of MoJ would influence the validity of the Concordat, if 
constitutional affairs will get the attention they need and whether there would be 
enough money in the budget for the courts. In case these issues were addressed, 
the judiciary stated that they would have no objections to the Ministry.  
As a response, Lord Falconer, with the support of the judiciary, put 
together a list of parameters for the working group which was charged 
with dealing with these issues. These parameters included no changes 
to legislation, the Concordat, executive agency status of the Her Majesty‘s Court 
Service, nor any ring-fencing of HMCS budget, and lastly that it would be 
for the Lord Chancellor to decide on budgetary issues. The working group 
continued to reach an agreement with the MoJ even after it came into being. 
The Lord Chief Justice even suggested he would exercise his powers under 
section 5 of the CRA - (1) the chief justice of any part of the United Kingdom 
may lay before Parliament written representations on matters that appear to him 
to be matters of importance relating to the judiciary, or otherwise 
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to the administration of justice, in that part of the United Kingdom.190 He stated 
that the judiciary concluded that there should be a ―fundamental review 
of the position in the light of the creation of the Ministry of Justice‖. Lord 
Falconer however did not support this view.191 
Jack Straw, the new Lord Chancellor, and the Lord Chief justice reached 
an agreement on the funding of courts in January 2008.  
The Government reacted to the recommendation of the Select Committee 
that they should always consider the significance of the constitutional implications 
by saying that they did not perceive the establishment of the MoJ, unlike 
the CRA, as having ―significant‖ implications. The Government also agreed 
on introducing safeguards which would protect the independence of judiciary, 
ensured the Committee and the judiciary that the constitutional affairs would 
remain a high priority for the Ministry and agreed on the involvement 
of the judiciary in the process of making a budget for the courts.
192
 
 Rule of law, separation of powers and parliamentary sovereignty 6.5
under CRA 
The principle of the rule of law is, under the CRA, for the first time 
included under a statute and it is the obligation of the Lord Chancellor 
and the judiciary to uphold it. By the international standards, the government 
and the society should also follow the principle to achieve a functioning 
democratic state.  
Even though the Parliament is still sovereign in the UK, the judiciary can 
limit its sovereignty in judicial review since the clauses which attempt 
to expressly prevent the courts from fulfilling their duties, such as in the Hunting 
Act, would be ineffective. Not only existing Acts but also the future ones are 
subjected to the rule of law. As showed in chapter 5.3.1. when the Government 
withdrew an Act which would have effectively limit the access to courts. 
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The balance between the principles governing the British Constitution has 
changed greatly during the era of the constitutional reforms. The sovereignty 
of Parliament has been for a long time the fundamental and the most important 
principle of the Constitution but now the power of the rule of law, enhanced 
by the judicial independence, has increased.  The CRA (and the HRA) both 
imposed limitations upon Parliament which now has to comply with the rule 
of law.  
The CRA was designed to ensure a more formal separation of powers 
by altering the position of the Lord Chancellor and creation of the Supreme Court 
and so it decreased the traditional overlapping powers. The relationships between 
the powers, which were previously governed by conventions, are now governed 
by the Act itself.  
The separation of powers, especially between the executive 
and the judiciary, was bound to happen since the judiciary demanded a further 
separation and it followed the trend set out by northern Europe to give the judges 
more responsibility and control for managing the service of courts.193 
While the rule of law has been strengthened by the CRA and HRA, the need 
for greater separation of powers is, according to professor Bogdanor, the central 
theme of the reforms and the British Constitution is now characterized not 
by the parliamentary sovereignty but by a separation of powers. The doctrine 
of parliamentary sovereignty is growing weaker but for now remains.   
―Britain is in the process of becoming a constitutional state one marked 
by checks and balances between the different organs of government and a state 
in which the judiciary now has a crucial role to play in the determination 
of individual rights and in determining the scope of government action. It is 
the beginning of the transformation of Britain into a constitutional state that 
forms the deepest significance of the era of constitutional reform.”194 
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7 Future of the Constitution of the United Kingdom 
This long process of modernizing the democratic principles and reforms 
has not only changed the British Constitution but it has also created a base 
for further reforms to take place. The CRA was amended by the Crime and Courts 
Act 2013, which changed the position of the judiciary once again, and the Scottish 
Referendum in 2014 is of great significance for the future constitutional 
development of the UK.  
The Politics and Constitutional Reform Select Committee of the House 
of Lords has also been publishing research regarding codifying the Constitution.  
According to the Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 there is also to be a General 
election to the House of Commons on 7 May 2015. 
 Acts of constitutional importance enacted after the CRA 7.1
Since 2005 when the CRA was enacted more bills of constitutional 
importance were adapted.  
Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 
The Act received Royal Assent on 8 April 2010 after the Bill went through 
extensive amendments in Parliament. The Act is important mainly because it 
established statutory basis for the civil service. It also introduced various 
provisions relating to the judiciary and the option to remove the Prime Minister 
from the process of appointing the Justices of the Supreme Court. The Bill 
originally included provisions which were supposed to reform the House of Lords, 
such as the end of by-elections of hereditary peers or provisions to allow 
the suspension, resignation, or expulsion of the Lords, but those were removed 
in the process.
195
 
A new power for the Parliament was also introduced in part 2 of the Act 
under which Parliament now also has the right to control the ratification 
of  the  treaties for the United Kingdom. This change increased the transparency 
                                                 
195
 Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. Www.parliament.uk [online]. © 
Parliamentary Copyright, n.d. [cit. 2015-03-06].  
Dostupné z: http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2009-10/constitutionalreformandgovernance.html 
74 
 
of the ratification process and effectively replaced the Ponsonby Rule 
a convention which previously governed the ratification of treaties.
196
 
The Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 
This Act has an impact on the parliamentary elections in the UK 
as well as the devolved institutions. It sets the times for the elections to take place 
on 7 May 2015, 5 May 2016 for the Scottish Parliament and the National 
Assembly for Wales and afterwards every fifth year on first Thursday in May. 
This will not apply in case the whole House agrees on an earlier date or in case 
that Commons pass the motion of no confidence and no alternative, government is 
created within 14 days.
197
 
Succession to the Crown Act 2013 
This very short Act only comprises of 5 sections. The Act removed 
the dependence of the succession on gender and the disqualification of a person 
who married a person of the Roman Catholic faith. The person who is one 
of the next six persons in the line of succession and marries without the consent 
of Her Majesty will be disqualified from the line of succession.
198
 
Crime and Courts Act 2013 
In 2012, the Crime and Courts Bill introduced amendments in its Schedule 
13 which influenced the CRA. These amendments were supposed to remove 
whole sections on judicial appointments procedure and introduced measures 
to assist in increasing of the diversity of the judiciary.
199
 
The Bill also proposed the option of the Lord Chancellor to sit 
as a member of the Judicial Appointments Commission and influence 
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the appointments of the president of the Supreme Court and the Lord Chief 
Justice. This was opposed by Lord Pannick who proposed amendments to the Bill. 
Lord Pannick was against the idea of the Lord Chancellor‘s further involvement 
in the process of judicial appointments. According to the Bill, the Lord Chancellor 
would be able to sit as a member of the commission for the Lord Chief Justice and 
the president of the Supreme Court. Lord Pannick stressed the importance 
of the separation of powers and suggested that this change would effectively go 
back to the state prior to enactment of the CRA. The involvement of the Lord 
Chancellor during the appointment process could undermine the authority 
of the president of the Supreme Court or the Lord Chief Justice in the eyes 
of the public as they could be seen as the Lord Chancellor‘s man or woman.200 
The Act attempted to increase the number of women in the judiciary but 
as shown in the chapter about diversity in the judiciary, the impact was not such 
as was hoped for. Another way of introducing the diversity in judiciary was 
the proposal of the Act to insert a new section into the CRA. The CRA says that 
the appointments of judges should be made on merit. In case there would be two 
candidates of equal merit, the candidate who would increase the diversity is to be 
chosen. The composition of the Supreme Court was also altered as the Act states 
that no more than the equivalent of 12 judges would sit at the Court (previously 
12 judges exactly).
201
 
 Codifying constitution 7.2
Since the recent development of the British Constitution caused significant 
parts of it to be codified and permanently undermined the doctrine of sovereignty 
of Parliament, not very many reasons remain for the Constitution to stay 
unwritten. The process of the reforms is also not final and many institutions, such 
as the House of Lords, will still need to be changed. The on-going process 
of the constitutional change could also be considered the constitutional moment 
leading to enactment of a new constitution. 
Professor Martin Loughlin compares the process of the change to an old 
building which is constantly being renovated in different and incoherent styles. 
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In order to start anew there would need to be an authority with a clear vision 
as to what is to be achieved. In Loughlin‘s opinion, the people responsible 
for drafting new constitution should be lawyers, while in professor Bogdanor‘s 
view it would be difficult to find someone deemed acceptable to all the branches 
of government.  
Both professors, however, agree that the new constitution should be 
written down, include constitutional principles, and be protected by law. 
In 2014, the House of Commons published a report called Constitutional 
role of the judiciary if there were a codified constitution in which they 
concentrated on different models of codification and the changes in judiciary this 
would cause. The models they considered were the constitutional code, 
consolidation act and a fully written constitution. With consultations from Lord 
Phillips and many professors of law, they came to conclusion that the judiciary‘s 
role would definitely change but the change itself is difficult to assess since there 
is no definition of the current role of the judiciary.202 
In 2014 a New Magna Carta paper was published as well by the Political 
and Constitutional Reform Select Committee of Commons as another report 
on the theme of whether to have a codified constitution. The Committee also 
asked the public to consider these papers and include their opinion on whether 
the UK needs codified constitution and which of the presented options would be 
the best as well as what should be included in such constitution.203 
In my opinion, the fact that the Commons published this report 
and discussed the matter in length must only mean that codifying constitution is 
being seriously considered. The opinions of various professors of law I introduced 
previously also support this claim. 
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 Scottish Referendum 7.3
The Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013 was passed after 
an agreement between the Scottish and the UK governments was reached and set 
the referendum took place on 18 September 2014. The referendum divided 
Scotland and the UK and drew attention to constitutional issues 
and the constitutional development for the UK. Even though the referendum was 
not successful, new powers and resources were promised to the Scottish 
Parliament by the Westminster. Debates following the referendum also brought 
up the need to involve the public more in the politics.
204
 
After the devolution of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, a debate 
in the Commons about the possible impact and options for different voting 
systems took place. Since the devolved Parliament and Assemblies now had 
the power to legislate in certain areas, the proposals included reduction 
of Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish representation at Westminster and 
the option to limit the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland MP‘s to only vote 
on matters which were not transferred to their respective Parliament 
or Assemblies. In 2013, the McKay Commission considered governing 
arrangements for England after the devolution. The West Lothian Question deals 
with the asymmetric devolution. Since England has no devolved body, there is 
an asymmetry where Scottish and Irish MP‘s can vote at Westminster whereas 
the English MP‘s have no say in the devolved bodies. The Commission came 
up with a constitutional convention which would affect the voting in Parliament 
in such a way that if the proposed legislation were to affect mainly England only 
the majority of English voters would be sufficient to pass it.
205
 
The English votes for English Laws question came up again on 19 
September 2014 only a day after the Scottish referendum, when David Cameron 
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declared, "The question of English votes for English laws - the so-called West 
Lothian question - requires a decisive answer."
206
 
Gordon Brown
207
 responded to the proposal of limiting the power 
of Scottish MP‘s by presenting a petition to the House of Commons. This petition 
was aimed against the Prime Minister‘s statement and demanded that the vows 
made to Scotland prior to the referendum be kept. He argued that there is no 
country in the world with a Parliament with two classes of representatives, one 
of which would be excluded from voting.
208
 
The Smith Commission was set up by the Prime Minister and led by Lord 
Smith in cooperation with the five parties represented in the Scottish Parliament 
to reach an agreement about new devolved powers for Scotland. Lord Smith also 
asked civic institutions and groups as well as the public to suggest proposals 
and their views which the Commission would take into consideration in its 
negotiations. The Commission put together an Agreement with three key pillars; 
providing for a durable but responsible constitutional settlement 
for the governance of Scotland; delivering prosperity, a healthy economy, jobs, 
and social justice; strengthening the financial responsibility of the Scottish 
Parliament.
209
  
The draft clauses of the Agreement were published in January 2015 
by the Government. A new Scotland Bill will come to force in 2015 and 2016 
and will ensure that the Scottish Parliament will be funded mostly by Scotland 
which will increase its accountability. The Scottish Parliament will also have 
the most powers of all devolved parliaments in the world when it comes to taxes. 
The Sewel Convention, which was until now governing the practice of the UK 
Parliament to respect the power of the Scottish Parliament, will now become 
a statute. The Scottish Parliament and Government will become permanent parts 
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of the constitutional arrangements of the UK.  The Scottish Parliament will also 
have powers to alter its own internal arrangements and the internal arrangements 
of the Scottish Government. 
210
  
Even after this report has been published, Gordon Brown remains certain 
that in case the UK is going to fall apart, as many Scottish people believe it will, it 
will not be because of the referendum itself but because of the proposed solution 
of the West Lothian Question.
211
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8 Conclusion 
The traditional British Constitution is a product of history and it has been 
evolving for many centuries. It is an unwritten constitution comprising of many 
sources including legal as well as non-legal. Even though it is not written down, it 
does comply with the description of a constitution as the main law of the state. 
The constitutional change has been most rapid and influential since 1997 when 
the Labour Party won the election. Since then, numerous reforms have taken place 
including the enacting of the Human Rights Act in 1998 and devolving powers 
to Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales. In 2003, without previous discussion 
with the judiciary or the Parliament, the Government introduced 
the Constitutional Reform Bill which proposed a great amount of changes 
including the abolishment of the post of the Lord Chancellor, creation 
of the Judicial Appointments Committee and the Supreme Court. The Bill was 
amended greatly after a debate in the Parliament. The CRA sought to address 
issues regarding the unclear separation of powers. It brought essential changes 
to the relationship between the executive, legislative and the judiciary. 
The independence of the judiciary was increased greatly by removing 
the influence of the executive on the process of judicial appointments 
and modifying the post of the Lord Chancellor. 
The position of the Lord Chancellor has been greatly reformed leaving 
the new Lord Chancellors, who no longer need to be lawyers nor members 
of the House of Lords, with limited powers. The Lord Chief Justice gained powers 
as the new head of the judiciary. The creation of the Supreme Court alternated 
the entire system of courts in the UK and replaced the highest appellate court – 
the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and its Law Lords - with a body 
separated from Parliament. The judicial appointments are now in the hands 
of the Judicial Appointments Committee, an independent body which is 
attempting to choose judges solely on the basis of merit whilst also increasing 
their diversity.  
The balance of the constitutional principles was altered and the previously 
fundamental principle of the sovereignty of Parliament is now being overpowered 
by the separation of powers, itself greatly strengthened by the CRA, and the rule 
of law which is now for the first time included in a statute. As a result, 
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the Constitution does conform to the European standards more than it did 
previously.  
The CRA was amended in 2013 by the Crime and Courts Act which 
changed the appointment of judges and set the number of the Justices 
of the Supreme Court to 12.  
The institution which is yet to be adjusted is the House of Lords 
as the alteration of its composition, which has been planned for many years, is not 
yet finished. 
The future of the British Constitution will be, in my opinion, very much 
influenced by the Scottish Referendum which forced many questions 
of the constitutional future to be discussed. The English votes for English laws 
question will surely be discussed in more length as it is highly controversial and 
angered many Scottish, Irish, and Welsh MP‘s. Sinn Fein, who have also been 
attempting to gain independence for Northern Ireland will, in all likelihood, use 
the Scottish Referendum and the Scotland Act to pursue its own agenda. I also 
agree with the opinion of the Scottish people that the United Kingdom may fall 
apart in the near future.  
Parliament has also conducted research on the possibility of codifying 
the constitution and considered three ways of doing so. Even though it claims that 
such change is not yet being planned, it seems to me that the simple fact these 
options are being explored could mean that, in the near future, the British 
Constitution will be wholly codified. On the other hand, the reform of the House 
of Lords has been planned and discussed thoroughly and has yet to pass so it is 
entirely possible that the codifying of the Constitution could take a very long time 
or not happen at all. 
The focus of this thesis was to introduce the impact the CRA had 
on the British Constitution. By analysing the relevant legal literature I showed 
the changes the Act brought to the British legal system. I focused mainly 
on the development of the post of the Lord Chancellor, creation of the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Appointments Commission as well as on the shift 
of the power of the doctrines guiding the British Constitution. I offered a view 
of the possible future scenarios for the British Constitution while taking 
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into account the Scottish referendum and the debate it had caused in the United 
Kingdom. 
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9 Resumé  
This thesis focuses on the impact the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 had 
on the British Constitution. The author uses the method of an analysis of legal 
literature to describe the impact. 
The thesis comprises of eight chapters. In the first chapters the author 
introduces the unwritten flexible British Constitution, its history, sources and 
ruling principles – the separation of powers, parliamentary sovereignty and 
the rule of law.  
The fourth chapter summarizes the development of the Constitution 
from 1997 when the Labour Party won the election which ultimately led 
to the proposal of the Constitutional Reform Bill in 2003. It describes 
the circumstances under which the Bill was introduced to the judiciary and 
the difficult and lengthy process which the Bill had undergone in Parliament. 
The two consecutive chapters are concerned with the description 
of the Act itself and the changes it brought to the legal system of the United 
Kingdom. The author mainly describes the changes to the post of the Lord 
Chancellor, the creation of the Supreme Court and the Judicial Appointments 
Commission. The modification of the principles of the separation of powers, 
parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law are also described here.  
The final chapter offers the possible future scenarios for the British 
Constitution in the light of the recent Scottish Referendum and the research 
regarding codified constitutions conducted by the Parliament. 
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